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This project outlines the assumptions of three schools of 
theory about ethnic conflict and relates them-to the 
specific example of Kurdish ethnonationalist violence. The 
first school, the conflictual modernizationists, blames the 
social changes and economic competition of modernization for 
the creation and strengthening of ethnic ties. According to 
'them, ethnic conflict results from modernization. The 
second school, the primordialists, portrays ethnic 
identifiers as traits that supersede economic ties. For 
them, ethnicity and ethnic organization are a natural, pre­
modern system' of differentiation between competing human 
groups. They believe that conflict results from deeply felt 
loyalties to pre-modern identities. These two schools have 
dominated the debate over the causes of ethnic conflict.
However, the third school analyzed in this project, 
the constructivists, best describes the conditions that 
have resulted in Kurdish ethnonationalism. The 
constructivists believe that ethnicity and nationalism 
are imagined identities, and that the ideologies of 
ethnicity and nationality are discourses that reinforce 
the legitimacy of or call for the destruction of 
states. According to the constructivists, a state that 
claims legitimacy based upon an ethnically homogenous 
citizenry promotes one ethnic identity as that;of the 
nation-state. When the national identity excludes 
other ethnies within the state's borders, excluded 
.groups resist assimilation, resulting in conflict 
between the excluded ethny and the state.
The example of Kurdish ethnonationalism exposes the 
weaknesses of the dominant approaches and the value of 
constructivism. Thus, future scholars must apply 
constructivist considerations to their studies of 
ethnic conflicts.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I. INTRODUCTION.................. .................  1
II. CONFLICTUAL MODERNIZATION:...................  10
COMPETITION THEORISTS
III. OTHER CONFLICTUAL MODERNIZATIONISTS......... 28
IV. PRIMORDIALISTS.................................. 51
V. CONSTRUCTIVISTS.................... ............  72
VI. KURDISH ETHNONATIONALISM. ...................  93
VII. THE KURDS AND THREE APPROACHES............... 114
TO ETHNICITt
VIII. CONCLUSION......................................  146
BIBLIOGRAPHY...............................      154
iii
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The issue of ethnic conflict strikes at the heart of 
most nation-states. A  recent study of ethnicity indicated 
that, while there were only 165 states prior to the breakup 
of the Soviet Union, there are as many as eight thousand 
distinct ethnic groups in the world.1 With so many 
ethnicities scattered throughout so few states, few so- 
called nation-states qualify even roughly as ethnic 
nations.2 These ethnically heterogenous states provide the 
conditions for ethnic competition or, even, violence.
In multi-ethnic states, leaders often politicize ethnic 
identity and promote competition along ethnic lines, causing 
difficulties for these states. Ethnic conflicts manifest 
themselves in international complications and domestic 
crises. Foreign governments intervene on the behalf of
1 James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 64. The 
study based ethnic diversity upon linguistic and cultural 
differentiation.
2In 1972, Walker Connor estimated that only 12 of 132 
contemporary states could claim an ethnically homogenous 
citizenry. Walker Connor, "Nation-building or Nation- 
destroying?" World Politics 24 (April 1972): 320.
1
minorities or sponsor terrorist groups that organize around 
ethnic identity. Additionally, the international community 
sometimes imposes sanctions on states experiencing ethnic 
conflict. Strong ethnic movements often accompany 
intolerance and violence, threatening economic and political 
order. Ethnic conflicts undermine the state at multiple 
levels to undermine international standing, domestic order, 
democracy, and legitimacy.3
Studies show that ethnic conflict is the most 
persistent and problematical form of violence in the modern 
world. Istvan Kende, studying 120 violent conflicts in 
Africa from 1946 to 1976, concluded that of the three types 
of potential, conflict, internal anti-regime, internal 
tribal, and border wars, internal conflicts were the most 
frequent and deadly. Most of the internal anti-regime and 
all of the internal tribal conflicts involved groups 
differentiated by ethnic identity.4
In recognition of the world-wide importance and the 
complexity of ethnic violence, numerous authors have
3Rita Jalali and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Racial and 
Ethnic Conflict," Political Science Quarterly 107 (Winter 
1992): 586-87.
\
4Istvan Kende, “Wars of ten years,” Journal of Peace 
Research 15 (1978): 231-32. in T. David Mason, “Ethnicity 
and Politics,” Encyclopedia of Government and Politics vol 
1, Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan, eds. (New York: 
Routledge, 1992): 570.
attempted to understand this problem. Several schools of 
ethnic conflict addressed the issue of persistent violence 
between groups organized along ethnic lines or between such 
groups and their respective states. Even until the 1960's, 
theorists assumed that modernization and economic 
interdependence would erode the pre-modern ties to 
ethnicity. These Marxist and Liberal theorists, the 
integrating modernizationists, expected the demise of 
ethnicity as a means of political organization and the end 
of ethnic conflict.
When the integrating modernizationists' predictions 
failed to come true by the end of the 1960's, scholars quit 
assuming that ethnic conflict would decrease, and they tried 
to discover the causes of violent ethnic conflict. Three 
schools of theory have arisen to examine the phenomenon of 
ethnic conflict. The first of these schools, the 
conflictual modernizationists, argues that the economic 
competition and social disruption of modernization increases 
ethnic conflict. The second school, the primordialists, 
argues that ethnic conflict results from the assertion of 
and the defense of psychologically-valued identities. The' 
third school, the constructivists, argues that ethnic 
conflict results from the construction of national 
identities that exclude ethnic groups within the states.
The purpose of this project is to examine the 
different schools of ethnic conflict and the relevance-of 
their theories to a specific example of persistent, violent 
ethnic conflict-- Kurdish ethnonationalism in Iran, Iraq, 
and Turkey. Chapters II, III, IV, and V review the 
different schools of ethnic conflict. Chapters VI and VII 
discuss Kurdish ethnonationalism.
Chapter II begins the review with a discussion of the 
Marxist approach to ethnic conflict and the competition 
theories that developed from Marxist ideas. These theorists 
portray ethnic conflict as a reflection of the class 
conflict. Whereas Marxists assume that loyalties to archaic 
ethnic ties would fade with modernization, competition 
theorists believe that the increased economic competition of 
modernization results in ethnic conflict. They believe that 
a cultural division of labor, with class lines approximating 
ethnic lines, causes violence between ethnies. However, 
these monocausal theories fail to address important issues, 
such as why ethnic groups choose to organize by ethnicity 
rather than class. Other, more complex theories of the 
relationship between modernization and ethnic conflict arose 
to address their shortcomings.
Chapter III discusses the other conflictual 
modernizationists. They argue that modernization radically
alters societies. It destroys traditional social structures 
and replaces them with modern economies and expanded 
polities. As the people within colonies and new states that 
are modernizing try to organize their society, ethnic elites 
utilize ethnic identities for their own economic advantage, 
and promote ethnic conflict.
The sophisticated conflictual modernization theorists 
addressed many issues .ignored by the Marxists and the 
competition theorists, but they lacked explanations for the 
apparent irrationality of ethnic conflict. Conflicting 
ethnic groups destroyed the economies and the polities along 
with the material goods over which conflictual 
modernizationists assumed they were fighting. Furthermore, 
members of- ethnic movements willingly sacrificed not only 
their economic well-being, but their lives for their ethnic 
identity. The destructiveness, deadliness, and apparent 
irrationality of ethnic conflict defies the material, 
rational assumptions of these theorists.
The primordialists, whose theories are discussed in 
chapter IV, emphasize the "irrational" elements of ethnic 
identity.5 Primordialists examine the psychological value.
5This project uses the term "irrational" to refer to 
nonmaterial, non-political, personal needs (as opposed to 
tangible material resources or political power assumed to be 
the "rational" goals of modern people). As shall be 
discussed, modern nation-states rely heavily upon
6
and emotional meaning of ethnicity. They argue that people 
draw a sense of worth and belonging from their ethnic 
identity. Furthermore, unlike class membership which 
theoretically can be changed, ethnicity is an identity which 
people have for their entire lives and pass on to their 
descendants. Thus, they will sacrifice their immediate 
economic interests for their ethnic group.
At the present time, the conflictual modernizationist 
and the primordialist approaches dominate discussions of 
ethnic conflict.6 Chapter V examines a third school, the 
constructivists, which has arisen recently and examines the
"irrational" loyalties for their popular legitimacy. 
Likewise, modern people have an "irrational" need to belong 
to a understandable order. This term is included to 
demonstrate that conflictual modernizationists' definitions 
of "modern" and "rational" inherently denigrate "irrational" 
behaviors which.are necessary to societies. The term 
"irrational" is not intended to denote inferiority or 
dysfunctionalism and any confusion caused by its use is 
unintended.
6Saul Newman, “Does Modernization Breed Ethnic 
Conflict?” World Politics 43 (April 1991): 451-78. argues 
for the inclusion of primordialist considerations in̂  the 
modernizationist discussions of ethnic conflict. Paul R. 
Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism (London: Sage Publications, 
1991). covers both the conflictual modernizationist approach 
and the primordialist approach on these issues at an 
international approach to ethnic violence. See especially 
pages 69-75. Milton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich, “The 
Study of Ethnic Politics in the Middle East,” in Ethnicity. 
Fluralism.r......an.d...-thd State , eds. Milton j.
Esman and Itamar Rabinovich (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), 3-24. takes a regional approach 
to ethnic conflict and includes the conflictual 
modernizationists and the primordialists.
relationship of ethnic identity to the process of 
“constructing” national identities. Constructivists argue 
that ethnicity and nationality are imagined identities.
They explain ethnicity as a argumentative discourse that 
legitimizes or delegitimizes the state.
Constructivists find the roots of ethnic violence in 
the promotion of national identities that threaten other 
identities within the state. Constructivists argue that, 
often, the ethnic group that controls the state promotes its 
ethnic identity as the national identity, and excludes other 
ethnicities from the national community. Since a state's 
claim to legitimacy often rests upon its claim of a 
culturally homogenous citizenry, it perceives alternate 
identities as a threat. Excluded ethnic groups resist what 
they perceive as oppression, and states defend themselves 
through violence, promoting conflict along ethnic lines.
Chapter VI discusses the Kurdish people in Iran, Iraq 
and Turkey, and the history of Kurdish ethnonationalism. 
Kurdish leaders, in the name of the Kurdish people, have 
fought the central governments of these states since their 
formations. In Iran and Iraq, Kurdish groups have demanded 
cultural autonomy from the governments. In Turkey, Kurdish 
ethnonationalists have fought for cultural rights and even a 
separate state for Kurdish-speakers. Violence between
ethnic Kurds and their respective governments have flared up 
as recently as the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War. The armed 
conflict continues as the declaration of the Kurdish 
Federated State in Iraq has destabilized the region.
Chapter VII examines how well each of the major schools 
of ethnic conflict describes the conditions in Kurdistan. 
This project argues that while the two dominant schools, the 
conflictual modernizationists and the primordialists, 
provide insight into the forces that exacerbate the 
conflict, the constructivists best describe the causes of 
Kurdish nationalism. Kurdish nationalists rely upon the 
traditional structures of authority that remain largely 
intact. Also, they resisted the central authorities prior 
to modernization. Thus, modernization did not destroy 
social order among the Kurds and did not cause ethnic 
conflict.
Furthermore, the existence of psychologically-valued 
identities, proposed by primordialists as the source of 
ethnic conflict, does not necessitate interethnic violence. 
The Kurds, Persians, Arabs, and Turks have welf-developed 
cultural identities. However, attachment to one's identity 
does not, in itself, require conflict with other groups.
For example, an affinity for one's "Turkishness" does not 
require animosity towards others' "Kurdishness."
Primordialists misinterpret the origins of ethnic conflict 
in Kurdistan.
The constructivist theory identifies the source of 
violence between the Kurds and their ethnic neighbors. The 
root of the problem lies in the national self-perceptions of 
the Kurdish nationalists and the leaders of Iran, Iraq and 
Turkey. Although economic forces, social disruption and 
well-established ethnic identities exacerbate the ethnic 
conflict, the unifying mechanisms of the three so-called 
"nation-states"—  Iran's suppression of threats to Islamic 
unity, Iraq's Ba'thist's aspirations to lead Arab 
nationalism and Turkey's insistence that the Kurds are 
"mountain Turks"—  necessitate conflict. Their presumed 
"unifying mechanisms" are dysfunctional and must be 
moderated or ethnic violence will continue.
Since the example of Kurdish ethnonationalism reveals 
the weaknesses of the dominant schools and shows the value 
of constructivism, future studies of ethnic conflict must 
account for constructivist assumptions. Scholars should 
quit focusing on the effects of modernization or the 
residual effects of loyalties to pre-modern ties for the 
sources of ethnic conflict. While these approaches enhance 
the understanding of conflicts, the problematical 
construction of national identities causes of conflicts.
CHAPTER II
CONFLICTUAL MODERNIZATION: COMPETITION THEORISTS
As recently as the 1960s, theorists of ethnic conflict 
assumed that modernization would reduce ethnic consciousness 
and ethnic violence. These integrating modernizationists 
predicted that the pre-modern ties of ethnicity would 
recede, replaced by ties to the modern state. The 
interdependence of modern economies and the social 
structures of modern polities would overwhelm ethnicity as a 
means for social organization. Despite their optimism, 
ethnic conflict continued in developing societies and-even 
spread into the developed world.
By the 1960's, most theorists abandoned the idea that 
"nation-building" would replace ethnic loyalties with . 
loyalties to the centralized states. Modernization and 
economic interdependence seemed to intensify ethnic 
differences. Something was fundamentally wrong with the 
dominant paradigm. Saul Newman writes, "as (ethnic) 
conflicts increased in number and scope, they were perceived 
as more than just stubborn- relics of a bygone era."1 As
’-Newman, 454.
10
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political science reevaluated the assumptions of 
modernization theory, it re-examined the issue of ethnic 
conflict, attempting to explain the rise in violence.
The conflictual modernizationists picked up where the 
integrating modernizationists had left off—  examining the 
relationship of economic forces to ethnic upheavals. They 
decided that the causes of ethnic conflict could be found in 
economic forces, and that "the relationship between 
ethnicity and class constitutes a key to understanding 
ethnic conflicts."2 The changes associated with developing 
economies, according to the conflictual modernizationists, 
caused ethnic conflict.
The competition theorists are the most straightforward 
of the conflictual modernizationists. Simply put, 
competition theorists believe ethnic conflict is the result 
of economic struggles. They argue that modernization 
increases the competition for scarce resources, jobs, 
housing, and economic opportunities, causing conflict to 
occur along "ethnic boundaries"3 as citizens perceive that
2Pierre van den Berghe, "Ethnicity and Class in 
Highland Peru," in Ethnicity and Resource Competition ed.
Leo Depres (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1975), 71.
3Fredrik Barth, "Introduction", Ethnic Groups and 
Boundaries. ed. Fredrik Ba.rth (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969)., 
.9-38. Barth’s term "ethnic boundary" emphasizes that the 
important feature in ethnicity is not the actual 
phenological trait, but the perception of identity. He
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their.interests are linked to those of their ethnic kin.4 
Competition occurs either' because of a cultural division of 
labor, according to the dependency subschool, or because of 
a split labor market, according to the ecology subschool.
Competition theory evolved from Marxist principles.
Marx believed that the social disruption caused by 
capitalist modes of production creates dissatisfaction and 
revolutionary zeal. However, when class lines coincide with 
ethnic lines, organization and conflict occur along ethnic 
lines rather than class lines. According to competition 
theory, ethnic collective action and competition, occur most 
often when ethnically- distinct populations are exploited. 
Modernizing societies' increased competition for valuable 
resources ignites ethnic action.
Economic competition creates relative depravity between 
ethnies and the economic disparity leads to strife. Ethnic 
conflict in a society results from more than inequalities 
and scarcity of resources. According to Chong-do Hah and 
Jeffrey Martin, conflict is most likely when ethnic groups
assumes that ethnic boundaries are politically and socially 
constructed, and can not be objectively determined. "Ethnic 
boundaries," thus, can be and are crossed, created, and re­
created.
4Susan Olzak and Joane Nagel, "Introduction," in 
Competitive Ethnic Relations, ed. Susan Olzak and Joane 
Nagel (Boston: Academy Press, 1986), 2.
sense that what is has is incongruous with "the goods and 
conditions they think they are capable of attaining or 
maintaining."5
Marxists
Karl Marx was one of the early theorists to address the 
issue of ethnic nationalism. However, Marx saw ethnic and 
nationalist sympathies as distractions from the class 
struggle. He portrayed the economic forces of capitalism as 
forces' that would promote universalism over particularism. 
Socialism would end ethnic tension and consciousness, 
replacing pre-modern kinship loyalties with modern class 
loyalties. Ethnicity, as a relic of a bygone era, would 
disappear during modernization.
Marx's eurocentrism resulted in his failure to 
anticipate the persistence of ethnic conflict. Marx 
accepted state boundaries as co-extensive with the 
boundaries of the societies and economies that he studied.
To Marx, language and sympathies determined nationality or 
ethnicity. He saw the world as clearly delineated national 
groups. Although relatively clear delineations between 
national groups described conditions in the Europe during
5Chong-do Hah and Jeffrey Martin, "Towards a Synthesis 
of Conflict and Integration Theories of Nationalism," World 
Politics 27 (April 1975): 373.
14
the post-French-Revolution era to some extent, it did not 
describe ethnic relations in the rest of the world.6
Marx accepted nations as pre-existing "givens" to 
such an extent that he believed that the class struggle 
would occur along national lines. In the Communist 
Manifesto. he wrote that: "The proletariat of each country 
must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own 
bourgeoisie."7 His assumption of a national bourgeoisie 
conflicts with his assumption of international revolution. 
One can not assume international worker unity defined, in 
material terms, but organized along non-material, national 
lines.
To the extent that Marx predicted the persistence of 
ethnic nationalism, it was as a tool of the ruling class to 
distract the proletariat from the class struggle. Like 
religion, ethnic nationalism was an integral part of the 
superstructure of society that was created by the dominant 
economic and political class to justify and legitimize its 
rule. It used ethnic and national identities to bind 
together different classes through the creation of a false.
6Even in the era of the British, Habsburg, and Czarist 
empires, map makers and diplomats identified regions and 
peoples within Europe with commonly accepted terms.
7Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist 
Manifesto, in -the Selected Works. 1,45 quoted in Benedict 
Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991), 4.
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a concept of national interest that concealed horizontal 
class divisions.
According to Marx, ethnic conflict is a mask for class 
conflict. He wrote that ethnic prejudice is "artificially 
kept alive and intensified by all the means at the disposal 
of the ruling classes (and) is the secret of the impotence 
of the English working class."8 He treated ethnic 
nationalist discontent as a disguise for real material 
discontent and aspirations for class liberation. In this 
sense, ethnic conflict is more than just a tool of the 
aristocrats. It is a symptom of a greater struggle.
Energies that would be channelled into communist revolutions 
fuel nationalist movements.
This is not to say that Marx.was wholly negative about 
the effects of ethnicity upon the political realm. Since 
some ethnic conflicts could hasten the onset of a socialist 
utopia, Marx supported or repudiated specific nationalist 
struggles according.to his determination of whether their 
success would advance the proletarian revolution. On the 
one hand, Marx supported some instances of Irish 
nationalism, and, on the other,- chastised Bohemian and
8Karl Marx, “Letter to Meyer and Vogt of 9 April 1870,” 
in Hall Draper, Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution vol. 2 (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), 237.
16
Croatian nationalists for seeking freedom from Austrian 
rule.9
Marx assumed that nationalism would fade with 
modernization. As economic competition caused by capitalism 
increased the hardship experienced by the proletarians, and 
the revolutionary vanguard educated them, they would 
recognize their material interests and be less susceptible 
to appeals to archaic ethnic loyalties. By the 1960's, 
however, the advances of capitalism and the spread of 
Marxist ideology in modernizing societies had not reduced 
the effectiveness of appeals to pre-modern social ties. 
Marxists could no longer assume that modernization would end 
ethnic conflict.
Marxist theorists since Marx have addressed some of his 
oversights concerning ethnic conflict. They argue that it 
is understandable that Marx, writing in the mid-nineteenth 
century, underestimated the appeal of ethnicity and 
nationalism among the working class. According to French 
Marxist Regis Debray, horizontal class divisions formed 
later in history than the cultural divisions of ethnicity.10
9Marx"s views on nationalism-are scattered throughout 
his writings. See Mayall, 161. and Jalali and Lipset, 593.
10Regis Debray, "Marxism and the National Question," 
New Left Review 105 (September-October 1977):25-41.
17
Thus, ethnicity persists at a deeper psychological level and 
demands greater subconscious loyalty from people.11
Debray identifies a historically necessary link between 
ethnic movements and workers' movements. He sees ethnic and 
national ties as essential elements of communist revolution: 
"All modern history demonstrates that proletarian 
dictatorships have only taken root where they fused with a 
national liberation struggle, or where they have defended a 
national identity."12 Revolutionary leaders can utilize the 
strength of ethnic ties along with calls for proletarian 
revolution to advance their cause. Where they have 
neglected to incorporate ethnic and nationalist loyalties, 
Debray blames this oversight for their failure.
The enduring legacy of Marxist literature on ethnic 
nationalism is its emphasis upon the economic sources of 
conflict. The economic upheavals of the conversions from 
feudal societies to capitalist societies strained social 
order. Marx mistakenly believed that the conflicts caused 
by these strains would occur along class lines instead of 
ethnic lines. However, later theorists pursued his notion 
that economic forces lay behind ethnic and national 
conflict.
u In this sense Debray agrees with Emile Durkheim.
12Ibid, 33.
18
Much academic research into ethnic conflict supports 
the case that economic competition between ethnic groups 
results in conflict. Teodor Shanin notes that the variables 
usually associated with economic class mobilization also 
correlate with ethnic mobilization.13 Displeasure with 
one's occupation, differential rates of urbanization, 
geographic mobility, educational opportunity, and choice of 
profession correlate with involvement in ethnic nationalist 
movements.
John Markakis demonstrates how economic forces resulted 
in conflict among ethnies in Ethiopia.14 The Amhara, an 
Amharigna-speaking, predominantly Christian, people of 
Abyssinain descent, dominate the economic and political life 
of the country. During the reigns of Menelik and Haile 
'Selassie, Amhara elites consolidated their rule over an 
ethnically heterogenous, predominantly Muslim peasantry that 
was expropriated from the land. As a result, leftist 
nationalists movements arose among other ethnic groups. In 
Ethiopia's poorest province, Tigray, oppressed ethnics 
formed the Tigray People'.s Liberation. Front. Other groups
13Teodor Shanin, "Ethnicity in the Soviet Union," 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 31 (July 1989): 
415.
14John Markakis, "Nationalities and the state in
Ethiopia," Third World Quarterly 11 (October 1989): 118-30.
19
included the Western Somali Liberation Front, the Somali and 
Abo Liberation Front, and the Afar Liberation Front.15
Conditions for Competition and Conflict
Competition theorists offer two models of the 
conditions that cause the most marked ethnic conflict: the 
ecology and the dependency models. The ecology model 
'proposes that different prices for labor between ethnic 
groups explains persistent, severe ethnic conflict.16 When 
one group undercuts the wages of another ethnic group, the 
higher-paid, threatened group will seek to protect its 
advantaged position. According to ecology theorists, this 
process of threat and defense explains ethnic conflict. 
Dependency theorists offer a model of a modernized "core" 
region and less-developed "periphery" regions.17 The ethnic 
group at the rich core exploits the poorer periphery 
ethnies, thereby raising ethnic tension between the core and 
periphery groups.
15Ibid., 124-25.
16Edna Bonacich, "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The 
Split Labor Market," American Sociological Review 37 
(October 1972): 547-559.
17Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism (Berkeley, 
California: University of California Press, 1974)
20
Ecology Theory 
The ecological theorists borrow their ideas from the 
science of biology, which shows that species can peacefully 
coexistence (provided one does not prey upon the other) when 
they do not depend upon the same sources of food to survive. 
When, however, multiple groups occupy the same niche in an 
ecosystem, they are forced to compete.
Similarity, not cultural differences, explains 
interethnic conflict in ecology theory. "Niche overlap" 
increases the likelihood of conflict and forces a struggle 
to the death, or disappearance in the case of an ethnic 
identity.
when two or more interspersed groups are in fact in 
at least partial competition within the same niche 
one would expect one such group to displace the 
other, or an accommodation involving an increasing 
complimentarity and interdependence to develop.18
When .separate ethnies attempt to live in the same region,
gain the same housing, and compete for the same jobs,
ecology theory contends that one must absorb or eliminate
the other.
Split Labor Markets 
Ecology theorists view a split labor market, one in 
which members of different ethnic groups whose price of
18Barth, 20.
21
labor differs19 compete for the same jobs, as the source of 
conflict. Split labor markets-reflect the existence of two 
or more groups competing for the same niche. "The more 
alike are the occupational distribution of two groups, the 
greater the competition between them."20 A  split labor 
market is the place, according to Edna Bonacich, where 
"ethnic antagonism first germinates."21
Several variables, which differ between ethnic groups, 
determine the price of labor of the workers belonging to an 
ethnic group. Price of labor is not simply wages, but also 
a group's resources and motives. For example, some groups 
consist primarily of members who lack the education and job 
skills to demand higher wages. Other groups consist 
primarily of members willing to accept a lower standard of 
living, or fortune-seeking "sourjourners" that intend to 
work only to return home. Such groups will accept lower 
wages, seek fewer rights, and are less likely to organize.
19Bonacich, 549. She describes a split labor market.
"To be split, a labor market must contain at least two 
groups of workers whose price of labor.differs for the same 
work, or would differ if they did the same work."
20Michael T. Hannan, “The Dynamics of Ethnic Boundaries 
in Modern States” in National Development and the World 
System, eds. John W. Meyer and Michael T. Hannan (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1979),_ 272-3.
21Bonacich, 549.
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Thus, they present a lower price of labor to employers and 
threaten higher-priced groups.22 .
These factors, according to ecology theory, determine 
whether ethnic conflict is likely to occur and be 
persistent. Different ethnic groups' usually "have lived 
relatively separately from one another are likely to have 
developed different employment motives and levels of 
resources," and, thus, different prices of labor.23 if two 
ethnies have the same price, there is not a conflict. 
However, it is more likely that one group will have a lower 
cost of labor than the other and threaten its position.
When a politically powerful ethny feels that it is 
threatened by another group undercutting its wages, it has 
two options. Its members may attempt exclusionary tactics 
or attempt to develop a caste-system. An exclusionary 
movement tries to deny a threatening ethny physical access, 
"thereby preserving a non-split, higher priced labor 
market.”24 A second possible tactic is the creation of a
22Ibid., 548-553 for a detailed discussion of 
Bonacich.'s formulas and consideration. She is mainly 
concerned with immigrant ethnic groups, but also implies 
that these same variables are active in other ethnic 
relations.
23Ibid, 554.
24Ibid, 555.
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caste system, or an "aristocracy of labor."25 To create 
such a system, the higher paid ethnic group legally 
restricts the undercutting group from certain types of work, 
limiting them to low esteem, low pay jobs.
Ecological theory explains the occurrence of ethnic 
violence between subordinate ethnic groups, such as that 
between blacks in South Africa or between African-Americans 
and Mexican-Americans in Los Angeles. Such violence results 
from one group threatening to displace another ethny. Also, 
it explains ethnic conflict in relatively prosperous 
regions, since it explains ethnic conflict in terms of a 
loss of position rather than as a reaction to poverty.
People at any income level will resist attempts to undermine 
their and their family's standard of living.
However, employers and landlords of the dominant' ethnic 
group, presumably the most influential members of a society,, 
should desire a split labor market with new ethnic groups 
continually undercutting the wages of existing groups. If 
ethnicity is a rational, economic issue as ecology theory 
supposes, they would always resist exclusionary or caste- 
creating measures. At times, however, dominant-culture 
elites, like subordinate-culture elites, have promoted
25Ibid.
24
ethnic differentiation. Ecology theory fails to account for 
economic elites that promote ethnic conflict.
Dependency Theory or Internal Colonialism 
The central concept of dependency theory is the core­
periphery relationship between ethnic groups. Dependency 
theorists posit a concept of a modernization that originates 
in "nodes" or central places and then "spreads or diffuses 
into more remote regions."26 This results in different 
levels of modernization within the same country. The ethnic 
groups that occupy the "core" have higher educational and 
income levels.
The result of this correspondence in spatial 
ordering's is that those ethnic groups which are 
most proximate to the locus of the impact of 
modernity tend to be the most modernized; and thus 
the competition for the benefits of modernity and 
’for status position in the modern sector can become 
organized on ethnic line.27
The "core" ethny, generally, has the most influence within
the state and promotes its culture and identity as the most
modern. Resistance to the dominant culture is viewed as
anti-modern and backwards.
26Robert H. Bates, "Ethnic Competition and 
Modernization in Contemporary Africa," Comparative Political
Studies 6 (January 1974): 464.
27Ibid.
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Dependency theorist, Michael Hechter argues that
capitalist forms of production create economic disparities
between core and peripheral regions that approximate class
lines and cause:
a cultural division of labor: a system of strati­
fication where objective cultural distinctions are 
superimposed upon class lines. High status occupa­
tions tend to be reserved for those of the metro­
politan culture; while those of indigenous culture 
cluster at the bottom of the stratification system.28
The division of labor results in the persistence of regional
inequality and ethnic solidary. Divided societies suffer
from rebellious ethnic movements among periphery groups and
reactionary nationalism among the metropolitan groups.
The cultural division of labor exacerbates the class 
conflict. Such a society is especially oppressive to the 
subordinate ethnic group's proletarians an peasants. Pierre 
van den Berghe argues that in a culturally divided society, 
"the inequalities of class and ethnicity become CUMULATIVE, 
and the system of- domination becomes doubly oppressive and 
exploitative."29 The class struggle becomes complicated and 
worsened by ethnic differences as subordinate ethnics must 
overcome the barriers of both class and ethnicity.
28Hechter, 30.
29van den Berghe, "Ethnicity and Class in Highland 
Peru," 75.
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Summary
Competition theorists can'use the ecological or 
dependency models for ethnic conflict to assess differing 
instances of ethnic conflict. The ecological model provides 
reasons for ethnic tensions among disadvantaged groups 
competing for resources in the same regions without 
explaining interregional disputes. The dependency model 
provides reasons for ethnic movements in the periphery 
against the core without addressing conflict between 
impoverished ethnies in the periphery.
Competition theorists fail to account for the motives 
and actions of ethnic elites. If, for example, ethnic lines 
roughly coincide with class lines, then it makes more sense 
for the leaders of ethnic movements in subordinate groups to 
make their appeals based upon class loyalties rather than 
ethnic loyalties. This tactic has the advantage that it 
might induce proletarians among the dominant group to aid 
the movement. Also, if the grievances of ethnic groups are 
primarily economic, then the competition theorists must 
account for their emphasis upon cultural rights and 
autonomy. They do not.
Also, competition theories fail to account for 
instances when ethnic groups experience economic disparity 
but do not conflict. Why, in some instances, do ethnic
groups with different prices of labor not experience ethnic 
violence? Why, under other circumstances, do ethnic groups 
experiencing regionally-differentiated modernization 
peacefully coexist? .-Both competition models are too 
simplistic to answer these basic questions.
Monocausal theories, whether they address intraregional 
or interregional competition, lack the sophistication to 
explain the complexities of ethnic conflict. Competition 
theory fails to deal with important questions concerning 
cases of ethnic conflict. It offers insight into the 
economic dimension of ethnic conflict, but its conclusions 
pertain only in specific cases. Other, more sophisticated 
theories arose to address the shortcomings of the 
competition theories.
CHAPTER III
OTHER CONFLICTUAL MODERNIZATIONISTS
The competition models left important aspects of ethnic 
conflict unaddressed, such as the motivations of elites who 
politicize ethnicity or conflicts between groups 
experiencing economic parity. Other conflictual 
modernizationists developed a more sophisticated view of the 
process of modernization and its effects on ethnic 
relations. They enhanced competition theory by proposing 
that the process of modernization, which destroys 
traditional orders and replaces them with 'modern' 
structures, entails more than just the increased economic 
competition. Conflictual modernizationists view 
modernization as a process with many aspects that affect 
ethnic relations.
Conflictual modernizationists emphasize that 
modernization itself entails changes that cause ethnic 
conflict. It upsets ancient societies and creates a social 
system where some groups enjoy the elements of modernity 
that give them advantages over competing groups. Also, 
formerly isolated groups, because of improved transportation
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and communication, find themselves in a broadened, complex 
polity in which they must compete with other ethnies. The 
conflictual modernizationists believe that ethnic 
competition is an inevitable result of modernization and 
increased group interaction.
According to an early conflictual modernizationist,
Karl Deutsch, modernization causes social mobilization,
involvement in mass politics, among the citizens of changing
societies.1 The social integration and the economic
interdependence of modernization promote assimilation into
the new polity. If social mobilization outraces
assimilation, then the society will disintegrate.2
According to Deutsch, ethnic ties cause:
consolidation of states whose peoples already share 
the same language, culture, and major institutions; 
while the same process may tend to destroy the 
unity of states whose population is already divided 
into several groups with different languages or 
cultures or basic ways of life.3
^ h e n  he wrote Nationalism and Social Communication 
(New York: Wiley and Sons, 1953), Deutsch proposed that 
modernization would decrease ethnic conflict. For his. 
changing views on this issue, see Walker Connor, "Nation- 
Building or Nation-Destroying," : 319-28.
2Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Its Alternatives (New 
York: Alfred Knopf, 1969), 27. By assimilation, Deutsch 
implies either the destruction of one culture, or the 
amalgamation of both cultures into one homogenous group.
3Deutsch,'"Social Mobilization," American Political 
.Science Review 55 (September 1961): 501.
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Thus, Deutsch accounts for the consolidation .and persistence 
of some states and the disintegration of others.
Low rates of social mobilization, as occurred in the 
creation of modern England and France, or high rates of 
assimilation, as witnessed when immigrants flocked to the 
United States, coincide with integrating modernization.4 
High rates of mobilization, as occurred during the sudden 
creation of many of the Third World states,5 and low rates 
of assimilation, as occurs among "secluded populations of 
villages close to the soil," result in differentiation and 
disunity.6 Countries in which assimilation had not occurred 
prior to the rapid social mobilization of twentieth century 
industrialization are unlikely to resolve their ethnic 
problems and differentiation, because modernization worked 
against them.7
4Peutsch. Nationalism and Its Alternatives. 73 and 126.
5Ibid, 73. Deutsch specifically names the formations 
of Tanzania, Zambia, and Malavia. He writes, "We have seen 
that the more gradually the process of social mobilization 
moves, the more there is time for social and national 
assimilation to work. Conversely, the more these processes 
are postponed, the more quickly its various aspects—  
language, monetization, mass audience, literacy, voting, 
urbanization, industrialization—  must eventually be 
achieved. But when all these developments have to be 
crowded into the lifetime of one or two generations, the 
chances for assimilation to work are much smaller.
6Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication. 12 6.
7Conhor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying," 326.
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The Destruction of Traditional Social Order
According to the conflictual modernizationists, the 
destruction of traditional social order during colonization 
or modernization constitutes a key element in understanding 
ethnic conflict. Whether or not they experienced 
colonization, modernizing societies construct new economic 
and political orders out of the existing conditions. 
Citizens, who organize their lives within family or tribal 
structures, must learn to cope with and assimilate to a new 
polity of expanded size and complexity.
Traditional status and authority lose their meaning in 
the changing society. Jobs that once commanded esteem, such 
as those of the hunter or tribal leader, become outmoded.
In a society that increasingly values the goods that money 
can buy, those in traditional positions of authority can not 
purchase the products of modernity, and their wages are 
shameful compared to.those of modern clerks, lawyers and 
teachers. As the structures of old societies fade, people 
re-establish social relations of status, reward, and power. 
According to conflictual modernization theory, this 
reworking of relationships and values is reflected as ethnic 
conflict. The interplay between the old and the new
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stratifications is "crucially significant in explaining the 
emergence of ethnic groups in the modern era."8
Colonization necessitated disrupting social order and 
indelibly left its mark upon the ethnic and social 
stratification of colonized regions. Colonial states 
created new centers of political activity, attracting 
diverse members into unfamiliar types of social regulation. 
European and bureaucratic mentalities rejected loose, 
vaguely defined, small-scale identities. They were "an 
anathema to administrative rationality, which demanded a 
physical map with discrete, bounded units."9
Colonizers created colonial borders with little or no 
concern for the ethnic makeup of the indigenous 
populations.10 Colonial states, once created, "radically 
altered existing patterns of social stratification and 
ethnicity."11 Binding culturally distinct, small 
populations together under'administrative rule, the 
colonizers created the conditions of later ethnic conflicts.
8Bates, 462.
9Crawford Young, "Patterns.of Social Change," Daedalus 
111 (Spring 1982): 79.
10Ibid.,75. When colonizers did take ethnic identities 
into account, it was often with the intent of dividing 
groups and recombining them with dissimilar groups as a
"divide-and-rule" tactic, thus aggravating conditions.
u Ibid., 76.
Europeans fundamentally disrupted ethnic relations in 
most regions. Except in Islamic regions, pre-colonial life 
was characterized by smallness of scale and isolation from 
competing groups. Ethnic and religious communities lacked 
large-scale political structures. Social organization took 
place around small scale units like the family, tribe, or 
village. Thus, cultural affinities were in their essence 
'interlocking, overlapping, (and) multiple.'"12 This 
fluidity of social and ethnic boundaries, meant an absence 
of "crystallized ideologies of identity."13 With the onset 
of modernization, ethnic identities were characterized by 
larger scale identities with more distinct boundaries.
Modernization and colonization destroyed traditional 
structures and ways of life. .Social status and values lost 
their meaning in disrupted societies. Small-scale 
identities were lost in an expanded social order. 
Modernization replaced ancient patterns of isolation with a 
system of unequal competition•between groups that had 
experienced differential modernization.
A  weakness of the conflictual modernizationist approach 
is its need for an outside influence to explain conflict 
within a society. It assumes that an outside force, such as
12Ibid. 79.
13Ibid. 78.
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colonization or a central state, destroys traditional social 
structures and sets in motion the struggle for status and 
wealth in t h e .new order. However, while ethnic conflict 
occurs in societies that have experienced the disruption of 
traditional structures, it also has flared up in 
industrialized states and in societies whose traditional 
structures remain largely intact.14 Lacking an external 
'source of the destruction of traditional order, conflictual 
modernizationists have difficulties accounting for conflict.
Differential Modernization 
Differential modernization is central to the 
assumptions' of the conflictual modernizationists. They 
believed that different ethnic groups modernized at 
different rates.. Europeans favored some groups, coopting 
them as collaborating indigenes. These groups, for cultural 
reasons or because conditions forced them, elected to deal 
with the colonizers on their own terms by acquiring European 
educations and competing for jobs in the colonial 
administration. Other groups, though not necessarily 
favored by the colonizers, inhabited regions closer to the 
colonial capitals and, thus, were exposed to modernizing ■
14As is the case in Kurdistan, especially Iraq where 
much of the violence has taken place. See Chapter VII.
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forces earlier. Still others resisted colonization, and 
assimilation or inhabited remote regions and, thus, were 
seen as backwards or unintelligent ethnic groups.
The most modernized groups held the prestigious jobs 
and the positions in the administrations of the colonies and 
newly independent states. They gained a headstart vis-a-vis 
other groups in the competition for the political and 
economic rewards of the modern world, thereby creating 
objective class differences between formerly classless 
ethnic groups. The emerging social classes tended to 
reinforce ethnic differences, creating "more naked 
confrontation and greater likelihood of secessionist and 
other movements of communal nationalism."15
Inequality between ethnic groups persisted and the 
effects of colonization outlasted the colonial period. 
Conflictual modernization theory argued that both the 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups develop new, economic 
grievances against other ethnies during modernization. "The 
seemingly inevitable, uneven economic development of regions 
triggers animosities among both the benefitted groups and 
the unfavored ones."16 Unlike group competition in
15Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and 
the Politics of Communalism" American Political Science 
Review 64 (December 1970): 1116.
traditional societies, which occurred between small-scale 
groups perceived of as equals, ’ethnic competition during 
modernization implies an unequal race between large-scale 
groups for advantages within an increasingly pervasive 
society. Often, those with economic and political 
advantages under colonialism, used their power to further 
enhance their advantage.
Increased Interaction 
Conflictual modernizationists argue that many of the 
non-economic forces of modernization impact ethnic 
relations. During modernization, formerly isolated ethnic 
groups come into contact with others.who are different from 
themselves, with different values, different languages, and 
different levels of modernization. The larger polity of the 
modern society intrudes upon their isolated world, 
regardless of their desires, and they are forced to adjust 
their lifestyles. Different groups respond to the forces of 
modernity in different ways. Some assimilate, others resist 
assimilation, and others attempt to assimilate, but can not. 
Ethnic groups' reactions to modernity's alterations of 
social structures determine the likelihood of conflict.
16Walker Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," 
Journal of International Affairs (1973): 21.
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Conflictual. modernizationists blamed increased group
interaction of modernity for ethnic conflict. With
modernization, societies experience increases in the
quantity and quality of transportation and communication.
Trains, automobiles, roads, radios, television, and
telephones decrease the cultural isolation and autonomy that
ethnic groups enjoyed in previous eras.
(Modern forces) curtail the isolation in which an 
ethnic group could formerly cloak its cultural 
chasteness from perverting influences of other 
cultures within the same state. The reaction to 
such curtailment is very apt to be one of 
xenophobic hostility.17
People became aware of others who shared their ethnic
identity and others who did not. Conflictual
modernizationists believe that this awareness leads to
discord more often than understanding.18
Modernization expands each individual's potential 
economic competitors. Modernization "penetrates markets for 
labor, turning local markets into industry-wide markets."19 
Skilled laborers, unskilled laborers, and job-seekers, 
whether they choose to remain in their traditional homes or
17Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying," 329.
18Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," 20.
19Susan Olzak, The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and 
Conflict (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
1992), 18.
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move to the urban, centers, find themselves in competition 
with vast numbers of culturally different people. In a 
modern economy and polity, tribal and kinship organizations 
are not powerful enough to compete.
To compete and survive, individuals must seek the help 
of a broader collective, such as an ethnic nation. For the 
person remaining in his or her traditional home, the tribal 
or kinship group has little influence upon political 
decisions made far away or upon economic forces that can 
render entire villages jobless. For the immigrant to 
industrialized cities, the tribal or kinship group is 
powerless to assist in providing food, shelter and 
employment. The result is a tendency to broaden their 
"ethnic boundary." Thus, the "spread of modern economic 
structures causes a decline in ethnic diversity"20 and 
fosters a population activated "on the basis of larger scale 
identities."21 Loyalty to and dependence upon family and 
tribe are replaced by loyalty to and dependence upon a 
larger ethnic identity.
Ethnic groups play an important role in helping people 
gain urban employment, income, and education. In Uganda, 
competition for jobs in the Railway Africa Union formed
20Hannan, 254 .
21 Ibid; 272.
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along ethnic lines.22 Since high office, in the union often 
meant promotion, employees fiercely sought these positions. 
Often, they appealed to the tribal loyalties of those in 
charge of hiring. In other parts, of Africa, "less favored 
members of an ethnic group place immense pressure on their 
more advantaged brothers to share the benefits from their 
advanced positions."23
In a multi-ethnic state, the economic stakes of one's
ethnic group losing its position are high. Often ethnicity
determines the allocation of government positions and
middle-class ethnics owe their livelihoods to jobs in the
government bureaucracy.
The state bourgeoisie has little autonomy relative 
to the state; its standing in society is not rooted 
in the control of property, wealth, or productive 
facilities. An individual's class membership is 
contingent upon remaining within the orbit of 
established political authority.24
The cost of one's ethnic group's political downfall might be
unemployment and poverty. In such a polity, identity and
victory, or at least'stalemate, in the ethnid conflict
becomes a life and death matter.
22R. D. Grillo, "The tribal factor in an East African 
trade union" quoted in Tradition and Transition in East 
Africa, ed. P.H. Gulliver (Berkeley, California: University 
of California Press, 1969), 297-321. in Bates 469.
23Bates, 4 68.
24Young, "Patterns of Social Change," 81-2.
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Politicizing Ethnicity 
The conflictual modernizationists'examined forces 
beyond those of simple economic competition. They also 
attempted to explain when elites will actively promote 
political organization along ethnic indentities, or 
politicize ethnicity. The broadened polity of the 
modernizing society increases the effectiveness of the 
"ethnicity card" in the politics of the new state. The 
rapid social and economic changes in modernizing societies 
create the "optimal conditions" for politicizing ethnic 
identity.25 Crawford Young writes, "The surest way for 
aspiring leaders to build their constituencies was to 
mobilize their ethnic clientele."26 Appeals to ethnic 
identity attach a real interest to a pre-existing affective 
tie.27 The politics of modernizing societies sets ethnic 
groups against one another for the rewards of modern, 
economics, and energizes the political strength of ethnic 
ties by attaching them to even larger constituencies.
The political competition between ethnies takes place 
in an environment of higher stakes and fear. For the
25Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics (New York: Columbia 
University Press),248.
26Young, "Patterns of Social Change," 89.
27Young, "The Dialects of Cultural Pluralism," 22.
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citizen of an ethnically divided society, while he or she is 
being appealed to on the basis 'of ethnicity, he or she. is 
also aware that other ethnic groups are being similarly 
courted. Even if he or she is not inclined to mobilize 
around ethnic identity, he or she may be forced to out of 
fear of the loss of position in the social stratification 
system or fear of domination by other ethnic groups.
For elites that politicize ethnicity within a society, 
the advantages of mobilizing one's ethny holds a second 
important advantage. Ethnicity is "distinct from all other 
multiple and secondary sources of identity people acquire 
because unlike all others, its elements are what make a 
group a 'candidate for nationhood.'"28 Thus, politicized 
ethnicity becomes a "crucial principle of political 
legitimation and deligitimation of systems, states, regimes 
and governments."29 Ethnicity is so potent as a 
legitimizing principle that, as Joseph Rothschild points 
out, people prefer bad rule by their ethnic brothers over 
good rule by aliens, occupiers, or colonizers.30
28Harbld Isaacs, "Basic Groups Identity: The Idols of 
the Tribe," in Ethnicity, eds. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. 
Moynihan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1975): 30.
29Rothschild, 2.
30Ibid, 14.
While earlier theorists had emphasized the "nation-
building" potential of ethnic national identities, the
conflictual modernizationists emphasize its "nation-
destroying" potential.
The nation itself, the object of every nationalism's 
endeavors, is artificial, a concept and model of 
social and cultural organization which is the 
product of the labours of self-styled nationalists 
bent on attaining power and reaping the rewards of 
the political struggle.31
Ethnic elites ask, if a nation is founded upon one
ethnicity, then why not found another upon another
ethnicity. Ethnicity could be created and re-created for
political purposes—  used to defend the creation of a nat
or promote its independence, on the one hand, and used to
attack its existence by supporting separatism or
irredentism, on the other hand.32
Elite Motivations 
■Conflictual modernizationists emphasize the role of 
elites in ethnic conflict. Elites, they argue., are those 
who have the most influence within a society, and it is
31A. D. Smith, "Nationalism and Historians!" 
International Journal of Comparative Sociology 33 (1992): 
59.
32This is the fundamental assumption of 
'instrumentalism,' the way that most conflictual 
modernizationists portray the formation of ethnic 
identities. See Chapter IV.
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elites that choose to politicize ethnic identity. The 
conflictual modernizationists look at elite motives in 
politicizing ethnic identity as a factor in explaining 
ethnic conflict.
The conflictual modernizationist A. D. Smith, in his 
book The Ethnic Revival, advanced a thesis that disgruntled 
elites, the professional bureaucrats, are prime instigators 
of ethnic strife.33 -The intellectuals conceptualize the 
arguments for any given ethnic group's nationalism, but the 
intelligentsia, from the upper and middle classes, 
politicizes ethnicity and carries the message to the 
masses.34 He writes, "If the intellectuals are the 
spearhead of the ethnic revival, the professional 
intelligentsia form its habitual infantry."35
In Smith's scenario, the disappointment of potential 
bureaucrats fuels ethnic movements. Educated, would-be 
elites seek employment in metropolitan areas and fail to 
become employed commensurate to their training. They blame 
prejudice and ethnic differences for their inability to 
succeed. They return, disgruntled, to their ethnic groups
33A. D. Smith, Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981)
34Smith, The Ethnic Revival. 108-12.
35Ibid., 108.
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and lead ethnic movements against the existing system of 
social stratification. They demand special cultural rights, 
which they as the elites of the cultural group can use for 
political and economic gain, or determine that a separate 
society is necessary for their success.
Jyotirindra Das Gupta theorized that some conditions 
decrease the advantage of politicizing ethnicity and, thus, 
make it less likely that elites will promote it as an 
organizing principle. Examining the complex, cultural 
divisions of India with its countless ethnic identities, he 
argued that when the cultural markers of ethnicity were 
"cross-cutting” instead of "cumulative," ethnicity lost its 
usefulness for political leaders.36
In India, major religious communities are split into 
many language communities which in turn are stratified into 
castes and class formations. Cross-cutting identifiers 
reduce the temptation for leaders to employ ethnicity to 
gain an easy constituency because it decreases the potential 
political returns. However, when ethnic identifiers are 
cumulative, with linguistic, religious, regional, or racial
36Jyotirindra Das Gupta, "India: Democratic Becoming 
and Combined Development," in Politics in Developing 
Countries eds. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour 
Martin Lipset (Boulder, Colorado: Lynn Reiner, 1990.): 241- 
43.
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cleavages overlapping, ethnicity is a. powerful instrument of 
advancing political demands.
In the twentieth century, Indian elites have attempted 
to organize collectives along linguistic ties.
Intellectuals created literary societies, cultural 
organizations and political associations to advance the 
cause of their respective language, but have been thwarted 
because language communities often included members of 
different races, religions, castes and regions.37
For example, in the resource rich, but poverty stricken 
region of Assam in the 1980s, Assamese ethnic leaders 
articulated a notion of the "unjust deprivation of the 
Assamese people."38 Earlier notions of Assamese 
authenticity had forwarded a concept of a language-based 
community. Later, however, the movements leaders sought to 
exclude many Muslim speakers of the language because they 
were immigrants from, neighboring Bangladesh. Other non- 
Hindi speakers and Muslims from the region drifted away from 
the movement and were used by Rajiv Gandhi's government to 
force the Assamese to mitigate their demands.39
37Das Gupta, "Ethnicity, Language, Demands, and 
National Development in India," in Glazer and Moynihan, 466- 
8 8 .
38Das Gupta, "India," 241.
39Ibid. 241-42.
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Ronald Rogowski used rational choice theory to predict 
when elites will politicize ethnic identity. He proposed 
two types of systems: "plural" systems, the classical 
cultural division of labor "in which one culture monopolizes 
the elite positions and skills," and "pillarized" systems 
"in which both cultures have ample numbers,of persons with 
both elite and nonelite skills."40 He believed that 
"pillarized" systems experience the highest probability of 
ethnic violence.41
In the rational choice model of ethnic relations, 
elites employing ethnic ideologies consider their potential 
benefit from the course of action, the anticipated cost of 
that action and the likelihood of success.42 Elites, 
whether supporting existing state policies or questioning 
them, choose to politicize ethnicity to "maximize net 
benefit."43 - According to Rogowski:
40Ronald Rogowski “Causes and Varieties of Nationalism: 
A  Rationalist Account" in New Nationalisms of the Developed 
West eds. Ronald Rogowski and Edward A. Tiryakian (Boston: 
Allen and Unwin, 1985), 91.
41Ibid. 90.
42Ibid., 88-89. He proposes the formula Ap*B-C, where 
B is the benefits of a course of action, C is the 
anticipated cost of the action, and Ap is the change in the 
probability of receiving the benefit if the actor takes the
course of action.
43Ibid. 88.
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Nationalism is always rational in the sense just 
given, that is, embraced by the given individual 
because, and to the extent that, it offers him a 
greater net benefit (or mutatis mutandis a lesser ' 
net loss) than do other possible investments of 
effort.44
He believed that rational choice explains how individuals 
from each type of ethnic group within a state react to 
ethnic group dominance-- whether by assimilation, isolation, 
apathy, or radical nationalism.
Thus, according to Rogowski, elites espouse ethnic 
nationalism most often in "pillarized" systems. This occurs 
because only groups whose elites believe they can supply all 
essential skills, or believe that they can compensate for 
any skills that they lack, will seek the destruction of the 
status quo.45 Elites will advocate ethnic nationalism when 
they expect that the future autonomous nation will have a 
favorable supply-demand ratio for their particular skills.
In "plural" societies, on the other hand, upwardly mobile 
elites face strong pressure to assimilate and will do so, 
taking the path of least resistance, if mobility is allowed.
By arguing that the economic motives of elites.cause 
ethnic conflict, conflictual modernizationists like Smith
44Ibid. The benefits sought, according to Rogowski, 
are economic gain and political authority.
45Rogowski Claims that the frequent rise of nationalism 
in regions that suddenly acquire great wealth or valuable 
resources, such as oil, proves this thesis.
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and Rogowski ignore the cultural aspects of ethnic conflict. 
They account for mobilization along ethnic lines, but not 
the emphasis by ethnic elites upon cultural symbols. Why, 
for example, do marginalized ethnies fear for the 
destruction of their culture, or the loss of their 
.historical and religious traditions? Also, they do not 
answer why language and educational policies concerning it 
play such an important role in the demands of ethnic 
movements.
Summary
The conflictual modernization theorists view 
modernization as a process that exacerbates ethnic tensions, 
creating conditions that are likely to result in ethnic 
conflict. Societies evolving from traditional economic and 
political structures undergo radical change. An 
interdependent economy with a centralized authority and a 
society which increasingly values the rewards that modernity 
brings replaces traditional means of survival, small scale 
social organizations, and traditional values.
The differential impact of modernization affects ethnic 
groups in. different ways. As the modernizing, expanding 
polity incorporates more ethnic groups, some adapt, 
modernize, and cooperate with colonizing powers, while
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others resist the effects of modernization, unable or 
unwilling to alter their traditional lifestyles. Advantaged 
groups use their power to improve their position, both 
economically and politically, vis-a-vis other groups. 
Economic competition between members of different ethnic 
groups and a sense that one's fate is inextricably linked to 
one's ethnic kin energize the importance of ethnic ties.
Elites, armed with the potent ideologies of ethnicity 
and ethnonationalism, compete for advantages within the 
changing society, where citizens increasingly rely upon 
larger ethnic identities as a modern support system. Elites 
try to gain important economic positions, and those who fail 
use ethnic ideologies of organization to contest the 
legitimacy of the status quo. These forces result in large- 
scale ethnic groups competing with each other for economic 
and political gains in starkly divided polities.
For conflictual modernizationists, ethnic conflict is 
essentially the result of rational, materialist interests. 
Modernization provides the underlying conditions for 
effective ethnic mobilization. Ethnicity is politicized by 
elites when it is advantageous, and it is used for rational 
goals. If conditions favor organization along ethnic lines, 
elites activate their own ethnic identities to gain 
positions of economic advantage or political power, or fight
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for a separate society in which they can hold these 
positions.
The conflictual modernizationists enhanced competition 
theory by addressing the motivations of elites and the 
reasons for organizing along ethnic lines. However, their 
reliance upon rational, material interests to explain ethnic 
conflict result in their theory's inability to answer some 
important questions about ethnic conflict. While their 
theory attributes rational motives to the elites, it assumes 
that nonelites are irrational, willing to sacrifice their 
jobs, and lives for the advancement of elites. Also, it 
disregards the “irrational” elements of ethnic conflict. It 
does not explain why those organizing around ethicity are 
willing to destroy the economies and political structures 
from which they hope to gain the goods of modernity. Nor 
does it explain the persistence of conflict over several 
generations, long after the original goals are forgotten.
CHAPTER IV
PRIMORDIALISTS
The primordialists emphasize the uniqueness of 
ethnicity as a social identifier. Primordialists argue that 
ethnic identity is unique because,, unlike class membership, 
which can change with economic and occupational changes, 
people can not alter their ethnic identity. The powerful 
appeal of ethnicity, understood by "poets, artists, and 
historians," had been lacking from the social scientist's 
understanding of ethnic identity.1 Each person has pre­
modern, historical, and cultural ties to those who share his 
or her ethnicity and,.thus, regardless of economics, his or 
her fate is inextricably linked to that group.
The primordialists explain two aspects of ethnic 
conflict that the conflictual modernizationists left 
unexplored. Whereas the conflictual modernizationists 
examined the rational, material motives of groups organizing 
along ethnic lines, the primordialists account for their 
irrational motives and the importance of ethnic or national
’•Isaacs, 30-31.
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identity to an individual's sense of worth. The conflictual 
modernizationists theorize about the motives of elites, and 
characterized nonelites as irrational or easily manipulated 
by ethnic elites. Primordialists account for nonelite 
involvement in ethnic movements and why they sacrifice 
personal benefit for the sake of their ethnic group.2
Instrumentalism and Primordialism 
Primordialism is best viewed as a theoretical response 
to instrumentalism. Instrumentalism and primordialism 
examine how individuals and groups create their ethnic 
identities. Most conflictual modernizationists followed the 
instrumentalist concept of identity creation and believed 
that ethnicity was a created identity, manufactured as a 
political tool for the advantages of the elites. 
Primordialists argue that ethnic identity is deeply rooted 
in the socialization process and the human sense of self 
worth.
Instrumentalism originated with the Marxists and found 
a large following among early scholars of ethnic conflict in
2Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, 
California: University of California Press, 1985), 147. He 
writes: "the willingness of group members to sacrifice 
economic gains for comparative advantage is redolent of 
ethnic group behavior that casts doubts on materialist 
theories of conflict."
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the 1950's and 1960's. The instrumentalists stressed the 
creation and re-creation of ethnic identity as a tool or 
weapon in political and social competition. Marx, and 
successive Marxists, emphasized the uses of ethnicity to 
incorporate competing classes within a given nation, for the 
advantages gained by the ruling classes.
Most conflictual modernizationists, in the tradition of 
the Marxists, emphasized the value of ethnicity as an 
organizing principle in social competition for political and 
economic resources. They argued that ethnic identity has an 
advantage over other potential organizational principles, 
because, "it can combine an interest with an affective 
tie."3 For instrumentalists, ethnic identity may be 
somewhat situational, circumstantial and transitory 
identity, but it provides a pre-existing constituency for 
those seeking power or. those already involved in competition 
for power.. Instrumentalists portray ethnic groups (or at 
least ethnic elites) as calculating, self-interested actors 
attempting to maximize their gains through the use of ethnic 
identity.
Primordialism has experienced three different phases 
during the study of ethnic conflict. Its roots can be
3Daniel Bell, "Ethnicity and Social Change," in Gla.zer 
and Moynihan, 169.
traced back to the simplistic notions of the Liberals, who 
saw ethnicity and nationhood as a given, a self-evident, 
natural principle of human organization. It enjoyed a 
resurgence in the writings of Durkheim and the "strain" 
theorists, who portrayed individual humans as incomplete 
animals that fulfil themselves through their social 
organizations.
Later, primordialism was revived as a critique of 
instrumentalism. Primordialism, "renovated by its dialogue 
with instrumentalism," re-emerged to explore ethnicity's 
psychological and cultural dimensions that explain the often 
irrational nature of ethnic .conflict.4 Fredrik Barth 
presented ethnic identity as a set of cues, symbols, and 
values (ethnic markers) that provided a person's 
distinctiveness; separating his group from the "others."5 
Van den Berghe related ethnicity as "an extended form 'of kin 
selection," and an almost instinctual loyalty.6
Ethnicity, in its capacity as a psychological link to 
the ancient past of ancestors and the unknown future of
“Crawford Young, "The Dialects of Cultural Pluralism," 
in The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism, ed. Crawford Young 
(Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 
22.
5Barth, 9-38.
6Van den Berghe, "Race and Ethnicity: A  Sociobiological 
Perspective" Ethnic and Racial Studies 1 (1978): 401-11.
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descendants', has a uniquely emotional charge. By examining 
the emotional side of ethnicity and the “irrational” needs 
it fulfills for those emphasizing their ethnic identity, 
primordialists explain the deep-seated anxieties, the fears 
for the loss of a valued past, the insecurities about the 
future, the horror of cultural extinction, and the levels of 
aggression witnessed in ethnic competition, which are 
unexplainable in terms of material interests.
Durkheim
Emile Durkheim1s wrote that the moral unity of a 
society is based upon’ a collective consciousness of "shared" 
experience, represented by and celebrated in common sacred 
symbols and "primordial" identification.7 These symbols, 
which can include anything from religious traditions to 
common physical traits, are the indispensable glue which 
holds society together. Durkheim believed that these sacred 
'symbols worked best at unifying primitive societies.
With modernization, societies' experience specialization 
of labor. Durkheim expected economic interdependence to 
gradually replace primordial symbols as the source of unity 
in advanced societies, and the primordial ties of ethnicity
7Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society. 
George Simpson, trans., (New York: Free Press, 1933).
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to disappear with modernization. He thought that the 
emotional strength of the "sacred symbols" would fade as 
they became less necessary for the unity of a society. 
Durkheim, like Marx, misinterpreted ethnicity as a relic of 
bygone eras.
Strain Theorists 
Strain theorists, like Neil J. Smelser8 and Clifford 
Geertz,9 borrowed from Durkheim's theories and concluded , 
that ethnic conflict would surge as a problem for societies, 
but would eventually disappear.10 As societies evolve from 
a reliance upon primordial ties to a reliance upon economic 
interdependence for social unity, strain theorists believe 
that many will suffer from "isolation combined with general 
'culture shock.'"11 These unintegrated' citizens cling to 
archaic ethnic identifiers for psychological security until 
their society achieves levels of structural integration high 
enough to include all of its members.
8Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New 
York: Free Press, 1963).
9Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System" in 
Ideology and Discontent, ed. David E. Apter (New York: Free 
Press, 1963),47-77.
10see Newman, 454-5.
“ Smelser, 326.
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Strain theorists posit the chronic malintegration of
society. Social friction is persistent and will always
require unifying ideologies like nationalism or ethnicity.
No social arrangement is or can be completely 
successful in coping with the functional problems 
it inevitably faces. All are riddled with insoluble 
antimonies: between liberty and political order, 
stability and change, efficiency and humanity, 
precision and flexibility, and so forth.12
To maintain social unity, societies, leaders and people,
resort to ideologies, like ethnicity. These ideologies hold
the society together until their inherent inconsistencies
cause them to lose their power as symbols of unity.
In Old Societies and New States. Geertz outlines the 
pattern for pre-industrial, modernizing state's attempts to 
maintain social unity.13 According to him, primitive 
societies rely exclusively upon ethnic kinship ties for 
social unity. The strains of colonization can be reduced by 
a continued emphasis upon race, language, religion, and 
customs.14 Often societies in contact with colonizing 
powers experienced a resurgence in religion and xenophobic 
adherence to ancient customs. Ethnic ties become
12Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," 54.
13Geertz, Old Societies and New States (New York: Free 
Press, 1963).
“ Smelser, The Theory of Collective Behavior. 354.
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politicized between colonized and colonizing populations,15 
Eventually, the strain theorists believed, ethnicity loses 
its unifying authority. Kinship, tribe, language, region or 
custom lack the unifying power necessary to maintain order 
in a modern society.
Strain theorists believe that unity in a modern society 
can only be maintained by calls to loyalty to a civil state. 
In a heterogenous colony or new nation, elites politicizing 
ethnicity would more likely emphasize factors of 
dissimilarity than factors of commonality. Since appeals to 
ethnic loyalty are divisive, societies must foster loyalty 
to the civic state. Geertz wrongly assumes that, since 
ethnicity becomes dysfunctional, societies will no longer 
utilize it as a. mechanism of unity.
While Durkheim and the strain theorists identified the 
deep psychological roots of ethnicity, they exaggerated the 
ability of governments to foster loyalties to the civic 
state. Although appeals to ethnic loyalties are often 
divisive within a state, many states have persisted in such 
appeals, equivocating loyalty to the ethnic nation (most 
often the dominant ethnic group's identity) with civic 
loyalty, and politicized ethnic identity among subordinate 
groups. The results are destructive because ethnic
15Geertz, Old Societies and New States. 112-7.
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identities were not as malleable as predicted. The state 
leaders did not create loyalties to the centralized state as 
strong as those that remained attached to ethnic identity.
Like later primordialists, Durkheim and the strain 
theorists essentially viewed ethnic identities as 
dysfunctional. While the instrumentalists portray ethnicity 
as a tool of elites to combat a civic unity that is 
disadvantageous to them, primordialists portray ethnicity as 
a psychological force that causes the same sort of 
disintegration. However, if one views ethnic identity as 
only a persistent relic of antiquity that complicates 
modernization, one implicitly criticizes those employing 
ethnic ideologies as disintegrationists. Primordialists and 
instrumentalists alike do not take seriously the demands of 
ethnic movements for cultural rights (except as.obstacles to 
modernization).
The Source of Conflict 
The group drive to increase or maintain status relative 
to other groups is the dynamic that causes ethnic conflict, 
according to the primordialists. For both rational and 
irrational reasons, the fates of individuals are attached to 
their ethnic groups.. They gain economic advantages or 
suffer disadvantages according to group membership. Their
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ethnic identity will be passed on to their descendants, so 
they worry that their ethnic group might be relegated to the 
position of "hewers of wood and water drawers."16 Thus, 
primordialists argue, they worry- about their group's 
position within society.
Individuals also receive a sense of psychological worth 
from the status of their ethnic group. R. Paul Shaw and 
Yuwa Wong argue that humans have an inherent survival 
mechanism that connects them to their group. This 
mechanism, which developed in the prehistoric past for the 
protection of kin and tribal groups, is misplaced in.the 
modern world.17 Individuals, through a process of 
channelled cognition, commit loyalties to their ethnic 
groups that evolution designed for smaller groups.18
Shaw and Wong envision this identification process as a 
system of concentric circles of potential loyalties, with 
the individual at the center and the civic state at the 
outside ring.19 The factors that influence at which level 
an individual chooses to commit his or her loyalties are the
16Horowitz, 175-76.
17R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong, The Genetic Seeds of 
Warfare (New York: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 23-40.
18Ibid., 65-68.
19Ibid. 107. They note that identity with all humanity 
is also possible.
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same as those that are associated with ethnic group 
boundaries: phenotypical characteristics, common language, 
common homeland, common religion, and the belief in common 
descent. Thus, an identification mechanism for the defense 
of the prehistoric tribe creates a sense of altruism and the 
tendency for self-sacrifice within individuals that identify 
with their- ethnic nation.20
William Bloom, another social scientist that related 
theories of identification to examine nationalism, explained 
the importance of the group identity to the sense of 
security of individuals. A change of "historical 
circumstances," which threaten a "generalized identification 
(such as ethnicity)" will also threaten the "identity of 
each individual within that group."21 Sometimes,
20Shaw and Wong imply that the primary location for 
these loyalties of modern people is the nation-state.
William Bloom, Personal Identity. National Identity and 
International Relations (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990) argues 
that nation-states have an advantage even over ethnicity, 
clan, tribe or sect, because they monopolize the use of 
force and are considered the norm in modern societies. 
However, in a modernizing society, this "norm" is not 
universally accepted and, thus, some states are unable to 
direct the loyalty toward themselves and the loyalties of 
their citizens remain committed to identities represented by 
circles nearer the center, like ethnicity.
21Bloom, 39.
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individuals are prepared to die rather than "betray the 
belief and negate an identity."22
Portraying ethnic and national identities as mechanisms 
of prehistoric social unity that have lost their meanings in 
the modern era presents several problems. For example, the 
primordialists need to account for why individual loyalties 
shift focus from the small group or tribe to the nation or 
state. The former are collections of personally known 
people, while the latter imply a vast community of unseen 
strangers. To postulate that such a shift has occurred on 
an international scale, primordialists must provide a reason 
for it. Alternatively, if one assumes that archaic kinship 
ties are transferred to modern nations, why are they not 
transferred to mankind as a whole?
The Importance of the Ethnic Group
As a consequence of the unique quality of ethnic 
identity, the status of an individual's ethnic group when 
compared to other groups is often more important to that 
individual's sense of belonging or self-esteem than his or 
her relative status when compared to other individuals in a 
society.23 People derive a sense of self worth from two
22Ibid, 72.
23Isaacs, 34-36.
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sources: their value as an individual and their value as a 
member of a group. Individual worth, however, is meaningful 
only within an enclosure of a homogenous group, comparing 
oneself to one's comparable equals. An individual can 
derive his or her worth from his or her personal 
achievements, but such "sources of belongingness and self 
esteem serve only where basic group identity (ethnicity) 
differences do not get in the way."24
Thus, the Chinese feel pride in their great past, and 
ex-untouchables of India do not escape feelings of 
negativity. People can derive self worth from different 
sources, and the relative esteem of ethnic group identity is 
of utmost importance, but most people need all they can get 
from all sources.25 This aspect of ethnic identity accounts 
for its political authority and the stakes involved in 
loyalty to one's group.
The Invidious Comparison Model 
Donald Horowitz provides a model of how ethnic groups 
formulate their identities, and their evaluations of their 
ethnic identities. He portrays it as a confused and 
complicated process that occurs during colonization. As
24Ibid., 34.
25Ibid., 35.
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Europeans sought to govern their vast new territories, they 
evaluated indigenous cultures, 'favored groups that 
cooperated, and sought the aid of these indigenous groups in 
rule. Groups that more easily adapted to European 
domination became identified as "advanced," "civilized," and 
"reasonable." Groups that resisted were seen as "savages," 
and those who failed to adapt as "backwards."26 This, 
process created tensions among indigenous ethnic groups, 
pretension among successful groups, and resentment among 
unsuccessful groups.
These ethnic evaluations were used by colonizers for 
their own purposes, to divide and conquer the indigenous 
peoples. Colonizers selected certain groups to assist in 
administration, staff the bureaucracy, and fight in the 
army. They relegated others to menial tasks and manual 
labor, more fitting their presumed capabilities.
With time, the presumed cultural differences among 
ethnic groups became magnified in intensity. The experience 
of success or failure as measured against European standards 
strengthened the meaning of ethnic affiliations. Those 
favored by Europeans, viewed as advanced and intelligent, 
succeeded in a Westernized society and those viewed as 
backwards and ignorant failed.
26Horowitz, 151-54.
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The colonialist thus set in motion a comparative 
process by which aptitudes and disabilities imputed 
to ethnic groups were to be evaluated. Those evalu­
ations, solidly based in groups disparities that 
emerged, could not be dismissed as the irrelevant 
invention of a foreign overlord. Like the new 
polity and economy in which the disparities were 
embedded, the evaluations took hold.27
Ethnic evaluations became self-fulfilling prophesies.
Ethnic groups' presumed differences, imposed by their
colonizers, became real to the indigenous ethnies.
As a result of this process, ethnic groups developed 
assumed cultural traits. Positive and advanced attributes 
included: enterprising, aggressive, industrious, arrogant, 
intelligent, pushy, cunning, ambitious, and coarse.
Negative and backwards attributes included: lazy, indolent, 
lacking initiative, polite, ignorant, submissive, dependent, 
easygoing, and proud.28 These traits became an important 
element of each colonized person's ethnic identity.
According to the invidious comparison theory, the 
members of each ethnic group collectively choose which pre­
modern traits to value and maintain (a society may view a 
part of its identity as simultaneously backwards and, yet, 
invaluable because it differentiates their group from 
others). Other ethnic markers and customs fade, victims of
27Ibid., 164.
28Ibid., 169.
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modernity.29 The^ remaining group attributes determine the 
success or failure, advanced-ness or backwardness of the 
group.30 An individual identifies himself or herself as a 
member of an ethnic group, his or her group's evaluations of 
itself and the group's comparison to others becomes vital, 
and he or she fights for the relative advancement of his or 
her group.
The demand to catch up to other groups or maintain 
status in this system of "invidious comparison" between 
ethnic groups creates ethnic conflict. As Horowitz 
imagines, colonization broadens the polity for an ethnic 
community, bringing it into contact with ethnic strangers 
who have mastered the skills of modernity better than 
itself.31 Backwards groups, with severe anxiety about the 
threats emanating from other groups, push to catch up or 
face habitual subordination.32 Advanced groups perceive the 
threat to their position and seek to maintain the advantages 
they have achieved; from modernization.
29Ibid., 172.
30Ibid., 151-54. Horowitz includes discussions of how 
location, natural resources, and educational opportunity 
also determine a group's status. However, it is the 
resulting evaluations of advanced-ness and backwardness that 
causes conflict.
31Ibid., 165-66.
32Ibid., 173-76.
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In addition to the pressure caused by the presence of 
ethnic strangers, members of ethnic groups are pushed to 
catch up by their own elites. The sentimentality for 
backwards traits often exhibited by former colonizers for 
the "dignity, politeness, and nobility" of indigenous 
peoples, finds no counterpart in the urges of their leaders 
to modernize, and assume advanced attributes, customs and 
habits.33 The pursuit of group status, along with the power 
and prestige that accompany it, assumes primary importance 
to group members.
Individual identity and group fate are inextricably
linked. Members of groups strive to associate that group's
presumed attributes to a positive identity.
Since the individual "sense of identity is the 
feeling of being a worthy person because he fits 
into a coherent and valued order of things," ego 
identity depends heavily on affiliations. A  threat 
to the. value of those affiliations produces anxiety 
and defense.34
Thus, the struggle for status among the various ethnic 
groups in a society takes on a deeply personal meaning to 
the members of ethnic groups.
33Ibid., 174.
34Ibid., 181. Horowitz cites Alan 0. Ros.s, Eao 
Identity and Social Order (Washington, D. C.: American 
Psychological -Association, Psychological Monographs, no. 
542, 1962)., 27.
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The stakes are high for ethnic groups trying to catch 
up to their advanced counterparts. Members of ethnic groups 
fear subordination. They do not want themselves, their 
descendants, and their fellow group members to become 
relegated to low-esteem, low-paying jobs. Likewise, they do 
not want their ethnic identity to suffer low prestige in 
comparison to other groups. They tend to view conciliatory 
leaders as excessively generous and even traitorous. Every 
issue becomes a survival issue. The fear of extinction is a 
powerful threat and a rationale for hostility.
Once ethnic evaluations, verbalized and delineated, 
sink in and take on a subconscious role in a society, they 
are an important determinant in ethnic conflict. These 
evaluations, based on stereotypes, become culture.
Following independence, political events highlight and 
politicize these stereotypes. Conflict between groups 
erupts in a struggle for pre-eminence in the society.
Summary
The primordialist approach to the study of ethnic 
conflict keeps scholars attentive to the power of ethnicity 
to overwhelm economic and class considerations. Ethnic 
identity links humans to their ancestral past as well as 
their descendants' future. As such, it holds a
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psychological meaning that surpasses the importance of a 
single life or lifetime. Simultaneously, it links people to 
a group whose collective social status holds deep, 
subconscious relevance to the ethny member. The social 
strain of modernization increases the need for both self- 
worth and finding emotionally-linked allies.
Primordialism also demonstrates that ethnic conflict 
becomes so murderously intense and destructive beyond the 
economic goals of the elites and persistent beyond its uses 
by the elites, because of the "unique" meaning it holds for 
individuals. Those motivated by ethnic ideologies compete 
not only for economic advancement, they also act out of 
pride in identity, a fear of subordination, and a horror for 
the extinction of a valued affiliation. This nonmaterial, 
“irrational” element of group identity in ethnic conflict
explains why elites and nonelites willingly destroy the
■>
political and economic structures over which they fight.
Primordialists account for the emotional power of the 
"affective ties" of ethnicity that instrumentalists see as a 
useful organizing principle. Roughly speaking, elites 
employ ethnic ideologies, which they may or may not feel 
emotional attachment to themselves, for their own purposes, 
as an instrument of political organization. The 
psychological strength of ethnicity, the implication of the
70
individual's shared fate with his ethnic kin, explains why 
the masses follow.
While, instrumentalists tend to exaggerate the 
malleability of ethnic identities, primordialists downplay 
the political manipulation of ethnic boundaries. The 
invidious comparison model assumes that groups, as they 
adjust to modernity, choose some primordial traits to value 
and maintain as group identifiers, while other traits fade.- 
With the fading of traits, ethnic boundaries broaden to 
expand the size of the group. Which traits are maintained 
and which traits are dropped determine which people are 
included and which are excluded from the identity. If this 
is a conscious political act, it begs the question of who 
politically gains from the resultant inclusions and 
exclusion.
Also, the primordialists rely upon some force to upset 
the pre-modern social relations among ethnies. In the 
absence of an obvious influence, such as colonization or 
modernization, the primordialists must explain what sets in 
motion the process of conflictual ethnic group comparison. 
They account for the onset of the invidious comparison 
process when colonization causes groups to jealously compare 
themselves by the colonizers standards of "advanced-ness" 
and "backwardness." However, how does this occur in
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industrialized countries which experience ethnic antagonism? 
Whose values determine the relative positions of groups? 
Lacking their own explanations for the initial causes 
of conflict between ethnies, the primordialists must rely 
upon the theories of the conflictual modernizationists.
Finally, the existence of strong identities in itself 
does not necessitate conflict. A strong sense of loyalty to 
one ethnic identity does not require animosity towards 
another ethny. Primordialists can n o t ■account for well- 
developed ethnic identities, which suffered from colonialism 
and are established in the primordial past, but do not 
experience violence.
CHAPTER'V
CONSTRUCTIVISTS
The third important school of ethnic conflict, the 
constructivists, challenges the basic assumptions about the 
formulation of ethnic and identity of the conflictual 
modernizat ionist.s and the primordialists. Other theorists 
see ethnicity as a demarcation of conflicting groups or as 
an instrument of political manipulation, but the 
constructivists believe that the creation of national 
communities, using ethnic identity as a basis for 
legitimation, results in conflict..
The conflictual modernizationists and the 
primordialists share certain basic beliefs about ethnic 
identity. They both believe that identity is created and 
re-created, sometimes consciously by ethnic elites or state 
authorities (as instrumentalists usually emphasize), and 
sometimes unconsciously among masses and elites alike, 
limited by ascriptive ties (as primordialists usually 
emphasize). Often, .according to instrumentalists and 
primordialists, ethnicity is politicized, created or re-
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created in anticipation of competition, during competition, 
or in response to competition.
Constructivists, however, identify the source of 
conflict as the way in which ethnicity is imagined. They 
agree that ethnic identities are created and re-created 
during conflicts. However, while others portray this 
creation and re-creation as the result of the conflict, 
constructivists portray the conflict as the result of the 
creation and re-creation.
The question of the relationship between conflict and 
the manipulation of identity is more than a simple "chicken 
or the egg" debate. Others assume that some other force 
(modernization or colonization for the conflictual 
modernizationists) starts conflicts that set in motion the 
creation and re-creation of identities (by expanding or 
contracting "ethnic boundaries") for advantages in the 
conflict. However, constructivists believe that the cause 
of the conflict is ,the political attempts to establish, 
create, and re-create national identities.
The constructivists argue that nations must'develop, or 
construct, identities that explain the unity of their 
members beyond the simple legitimation of the civil state.
To persist in modernity, nations and ethnic nations must 
create a consciousness of the greater nation such that the
74
members of the group perceive a common bond with others that 
they never have met or never wi-ll meet. Social ties, such 
as common culture, language, race, ethnicity, religion, or 
sense of history foster unification. When individuals are 
excluded from the national identity, or drawn to alternative 
identities, the divided society suffers competition or 
conflict.
According to the constructivists, modern ethnic 
identity is an ideology that results from intentional 
political efforts and accidents of history. Standardizing 
languages, drawing maps, taking census and writing national 
histories constructs the social reality of a nation. The 
viability and attraction of the constructed nation depends 
upon its ability to establish its legitimacy in history.
Nations and ethnic identities' define themselves, in a 
sense, by what they are not—  what is outside the identity. 
Thus, some identities base themselves upon opposition to 
outsiders. Nineteenth and twentieth century colonial 
nationalists, for example, identified themselves and their 
nations as "not European." The outside-inside identity 
relationship plays an important role in constructivist 
theory of ethnic conflict.
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The National Mvth 
Constructivists assert that a nation-state must create 
a national culture at some level if it is to survive. 
"Nations need myths to live by," according to James Mayall 
and Mark Simpson.1 Ethnicities, like ideologies, contain 
varying capacities to attract followers. Ethnicities and 
nations must establish themselves in the mythical past to 
achieve legitimacy among their potential adherents. The 
communality of the group is celebrated in rituals and 
symbols that are deliberate political inventions to create 
the essence of nationhood.2
The ability to construct a useable national myth 
determines a nation's or an ethnic identity's viability.
For a nation-state, the inability to create a national 
culture and focus loyalties upon the centralized state 
results in conflict and secession. Likewise, the existence 
of an ethnic culture, or any competing identity that 
attracts strong loyalties counter to the central authority, 
causes a competition for legitimacy. Strong identities
1 James Mayall and Mark Simpson, "Ethnicity is not 
Enough: Reflections on Protracted Secessionism in the Third 
World," International Journal of Comparative Sociology 33 
(1992): 10.
2Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, .eds., The Invention 
of Tradition (Cambridge: University Press, 1983).
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challenge a state's legitimacy and offer potential ethnic 
nationalisms that weaken its authority.
The works of Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, and Terence 
Ranger discuss how ethnicity and the nation are imagined. 
They write that the "historical" traditions of nations are 
invented. Nationalists promote symbols and historical 
traditions that create a sense that the nation has existed 
since the prehistoric past. The nation and patriotic 
loyalty to it, thus, are defensible as respect for the past 
and the practical acceptance of a historical "given."
According to Gellner, "nationalism is not the awakening 
of.nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where 
they do not exist."3 The nation-state system and modern 
economies require nation-states. They are necessary for 
international legitimacy and are the mechanisms for legal 
regulation of modern economies. The imperatives of 
industrial society, which necessitate homogeneity, pressures 
societies to become homogenous. This pressure "eventually 
appears on the surface in the form of nationality."4 
Nationality, then, is a fabrication, created by nationalists 
to justify statehood.
3Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicholson, 1964), 169.
4Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1983), 39.
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In The Invention of Tradition, Hobsbawm and Ranger, 
emphasize the artificial nature of national identity. Hugh 
Trevor-Roper5 points out that many Scottish customs, such as 
the kilt, were actually the invention of late nineteenth 
century nationalist.6 Falsified pasts were fabricated in 
many ways and symbols of so-called national traditions were 
presented as respect for the past and respect for the 
historical roots of the nation.
Historical continuity had to be invented for
nationalism. This was achieved through:
semi-fiction (Boadicea, Vercingetorix, Arminus the 
Cheruscan) or by forgery (Ossian, the Czech medieval 
manuscripts). It is also clear that entirely new 
symbols and devices came into existence as part of 
national movements and states, such as the national 
anthem, the national flag, or the personification of 
'the nation' in symbol or image, either official, as 
with Marianne and Germania, or unofficial, as in the 
cartoon stereotypes of John Bull, the lean Yankee 
Uncle Sam and the 'German Michel.'7
In the age of nationalism, Europeans invented many of the
public symbols associated with the nation.
.5Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Invention of Tradition:. The 
Highland Tradition of Scotland," in Hobsbawm and Ranger, 15- 
42.
6The kilt was imposed by eighteenth century English 
Quakers who wanted their scantily clad Scottish factory 
workers properly dressed. It was later revived among the 
British gentry by those who wanted to advertise their 
highland roots.
7Hobsbawm,- "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in
Hobsbawm and Ranger, 7.
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The invention of tradition was not limited to Europe. 
Ranger describes how Africa imported the concepts of. "the 
tribe" and "the nation" from Europe.8 Before the "false" 
Africa of the colonialist era, Ranger claims that there was 
an Africa where tribal identities were radically different.9 
In another work, Ranger describes how people speaking 
dialects referred to as Shona were divided into hundreds of 
tribes by the Rhodesian government, and how Methodist 
Episcopal, Dutch Reformed, Jesuit, and Trappist missions 
created the Manyika, Karanga and Zezuru languages.10
The French National Identity
The dominant way for nations to imagine or define their 
nationality, the French model, necessitated problems for the 
ethnically heterogenous imitators that followed it. French 
nationalists, during the French Revolution, formulated a
8Ranger, "The Invention of Tradition in Colonial 
Africa," in Hobsbawm and Ranger, 211-262.
9An important debate.rages among constructivists. They 
argue whether, amid the constructed identities, there ever 
were "genuine" nationalities. Anderson criticizes the 
usefulness of the "genuine-ness" paradigm, while Hobsbawm 
and Ranger imply that "genuine" nationalities would not be 
as problematical as the constructed ones.
10Ranger, "Missionaries, Migrants, and the Manyika," in 
The Creation- of Tribalism in Southern Africa, ed. Leroy Vail 
(Berkeley, California: University of California Press,
1989), 118-50.
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concept of nationhood that envisioned the legitimate nation 
as a state governing an ethnically homogenous, sovereign 
people.11 Others that tried to adhere to this model 
discovered that the ethnies that were excluded from the 
national culture within their states claimed to be separate 
peoples deserving their own state.
Benedict Anderson traces the formulation of the French 
model of an ethnic nation.12 The leaders of the French 
Revolution advanced a concept of the nation that included 
those of European descent who spoke French as their first 
language. Adherence to this linguistic standard was 
enforced throughout the regions formerly under Bourbon 
control. "Frenchness," speaking standardized French and 
recognizing Paris as the central authority, was violently 
imposed by the Revolutionary government.
The French model of the homogenous and linguistic 
"nation" entails a mythical attachment between the native- 
born speakers of the language that dominates a geographic 
region and the land of that region. Dominant-language 
speakers came to presume that ethnically and linguistically
u Liah Greenfield, Nationalism: Four Roads to Modernity
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992), 
91-188. Greenfield discusses the formation of French ideas 
of nationalism. She discusses the role of Rousseau's 
philosophy on pages 172-77.
12Anderson, Imagined Communities. 67-82.
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different people did not belong and that even learning the
language did not entitle one to enter into the national
community. One needed to be born into it.
The lexicographic revolution in Europe, however, 
created and gradually spread, the conviction that 
languages (in Europe at least) were, so to speak, 
the personal property of quite specific groups-- 
their daily speakers anqL readers—  and moreover 
that these groups, imagined as communities, were 
entitled to their autonomous place in a fraternity 
of equals.13
Other nationalisms of the same era, such as those that 
arose in Germany as a response to the French invasion, also 
asserted the French model of an imagined nation. Germans, 
for a large part, defined their nationality in terms of 
opposition to France.14 Important nationalist songs like 
"Wacht am Rhein” emphasize that Germany arose in military 
struggle against the French. Despite this, or possibly 
because of it, Germans imagine their ethnic nationality in a 
fashion similar to the French—  people of European descent, 
born in a land called "Germany," and who speak German as 
their first language.
According to constructivist theory, the imposition of 
ethnic homogeneity, implied by the French model of a 
legitimate nation, and the demands for. nationhood by those
13Ibid., 84.
14Hobsbawm, "Mass Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870- 
1914," in Hobsbawm and Ranger, 277-278.
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who argue for the existence of their ethnic nation cause 
ethnic violence. States attempt to integrate and homogenize 
their diverse populations to meet international standards of 
nationhood and to eliminate potential threats of separatist 
or irredentist movements. Ethnies, whose elites created a 
strong enough "imagined community" to survive, resist 
integration.
Other Models
Although the French model dominated throughout the 
twentieth century, Anderson outlines other versions of 
nationalism that existed. The North American model, the 
first nationalist movement, pre-dated the French model. 
Additionally, the regions affected by the collapse of the 
Spanish Empire between 1810 and 1830 experienced a style 
different from Europe. These models defined their 
respective nations without ethnic descent.
North American nationalism was qualitatively different 
from the French model. Although the leaders of the American 
Revolution were predominantly Protestants of English 
descent, inclusion in the nation was not based upon ethnic 
descent.15 Black slaves and indigenous peoples were 
excluded, as were Catholics, and later Southern European and
15Anderson, Imagined Communities. 47-65.
Asian.immigrants. Inclusion in the constructed national 
community was not based upon one's ancestors' presumed 
inhabitance in the country since supposedly everyone's 
ancestors had immigrated at some time.16 Unlike in France, 
the descendants of immigrants could readily assimilate to 
the dominant culture (much more easily provided they were 
white Protestants). While white Protestants enjoyed many 
social advantages, Americans lacked a sense that being 
"American" was rooted in a historic connection to the land 
or the dominant language.
Those of European descent in Latin America imagined 
their nations in a similar fashion.17 The nations 
associated with the despotisms, rebellions, and civil wars 
that followed the collapse of Spain shared with North 
America that, so long as one could speak the language of'the 
economic elites (English in North America, Spanish or 
Portuguese in Central and South America), ethnicity was not 
a barrier to inclusion within the nation. Generally, 
governments in the Western Hemisphere ruled in the name of a
16Note, however, that there is prestige attached to
one's family having long-term residence in the new world.
17Anderson, Imagined Communities. 47-65.
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sovereign people (though not necessarily democratically) 
that was not ethnically exclusive.18
The nationalities of the following eras were imagined 
in two different ways: the anti-colonial version and the 
French version.19 The nationalisms of the early twentieth 
century, those that followed the collapse of the Habsburg, 
Ottoman, Russian, and Ch'ing empires, and the nationalisms 
of the post World War II eras, following the collapse of the 
bourgeois empires of France, Britain, Holland, Belgium, and 
Portugal often followed the anti-colonial model of 
nationalism. However, the leaders in these newly 
independent states eventually forwarded the French, 
linguistic, ethnically homogenous model.
The usually temporary third version of nationalism, 
developed among ethnic elites who had been discriminated 
against by Europeans, was essentially anti-European in 
nature. The "nation" in many post-colonial states consisted 
of all non-Europeans. Ethnic elites, who had attempted to 
assimilate to Western culture, competed for jobs in the
18van den Berghe notes that indigenous peoples and 
those of European or part-European descent are visually 
indistinguishable. Pierre van den Berghe, "The Ixil 
Triangle," in State Violence and Ethnicity.e d . Pierre van 
•den Berghe (Niwot, Colorado: University Press of Colorado,
1990), 253-288.
19Anderson, "The New World Disorder," New Left Review 
193 (May- June 1992): 3-4.
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colonial bureaucracies. Like the North American and Latin 
American creole pioneers of earlier eras, these indigenous 
elites found that they were limited to lateral movements 
within the bureaucracies, and denied the prestigious 
promotions to the European capitals.20 In their frustrated 
"journeys" from post to post within the colonies, these 
elites met fellow ethnic "sojourners" who shared their fate. 
Among these elites, the new form of nationalism arose.
Anderson relates the story of Bipin Chandra Pal of 
India in 1932.21 He was educated in England and subjected 
to the same civil service exams as his England-born 
competitors. However, regardless of how well he performed 
within a supposed meritocracy, his ethnic identity 
restricted him to work within the Indian subcontinent. 
Thwarted elites, like Bipin Chandra Pal, imagined a 
community of "thousands and thousands like themselves," 
similarly frustrated.22 The social barriers against the 
members of their imagined community convinced the elites 
that they needed and deserved a nation of their own, 
independent of the Europeans.
20Anderson uses "creole" to denote native-born people
of European descent.
21Anderson, Imagined Communities. 92-93.
22Ibid., 77.
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To create the new "nationalities", elites not only 
first’imagined the community, they formulated the 
definitions of it. The attitudes of these nationalist 
elites ("culture-brokers")23 shaped what ethnic markers —  
language, culture, religions—  became included within the 
boundaries and textures of the new identity. Early on, the 
definitions were broadly inclusive of non-European ethnies.
Following independence, however, nationalisms that were 
essentially anti-European evolved in the face of pressures 
from ethnonationalisms among groups that forwarded a French 
model of nationalism. Former colonies lacked a "usable pre­
colonial past from which a modern national myth (could) be 
constructed."24 Separatist groups, advancing an "ethnic 
homogeneity" concept of the nation forwarded competing 
claims to legitimacy. Many of these groups were capable of 
creating a national myth for their ethnic identity that 
questioned the legitimacy of the central governments. The 
governments that survived often were captured by groups that 
enforced a linguistic, ethnically homogenous model of 
nationalism, despite the reality of the ethnic identities 
within the populace.
23Vail, 11.
24Mayall and Simpson, 10.
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Problems For The French Model 
The imposition of linguistic and ethnic homogeneity 
along the French style of nationalism causes the repression 
of dissident ethnicities. For example, Anderson places the 
blame for the bloody, genocidal policies of the Khmer Rouge 
less on the cruelty, paranoia, and megalomania of its Khmer­
speaking leadership than on their efforts to follow the 
models of the French and their national revolution. The 
inherent conflict between the Khmer Rouge's vision of 
Cambodia and its ethnic reality resulted in a genocidal 
campaign to prevent a challenge to nationalist rule.
The conflictual modernizationists and the 
primordialists that follow instrumentalist or primordialist 
concepts of ethnicity often have difficulty explaining 
instances of ethnic cooperation. They can not account for 
why and under what circumstances ethnic groups co-exist. 
Their theories fail to explain economic disparity and 
competition between ethnic groups without conflict. Nor do 
they explain cases of well-established identities within the 
same state that enjoy peaceful relations.
Constructivism accounts for these cases by examining 
the ways in which identities are constructed. Inclusive 
nationalisms, which do not exclude groups on the bases of 
language, religion, culture or race, experience less
87
violence, because separatism and anti-state ethnic violence 
develops "in a large part in reaction to insensitive 
policies of the central authorities."25 Exclusive societies 
foster- dissent among those that do not share the identity 
propagated in the national myth.
Constructivists propose that national identities, those 
formed to legitimize the state, must be inclusive enough to 
incorporate the potential ethnic identities within the 
state. Elites and collectives, for reasons outlined in 
instrumentalist and primordialist literature, may seek to 
establish their legitimacy counter to the state's. The 
interplay between the national state's proposed identity and 
those alternatives to it determines the forces of ethnic 
conflict and whether the different sides pursue violent 
resolutions. Constructivist literature is rich with 
examples of community identity formation and how those 
formations affect the viability of states, ethnies, the 
levels of violence in ethnic conflict, and the probability 
of conflict resolution. Multiple or powerful ethnicities, 
whether imagined or not, and inflexibility by dominant or 
subordinant groups are a constructivist's recipe for 
persistent violence.26
25Mayall and Simpson, 15.
26Ibid., 14-18.
Inclusive Nationalisms
Juan J. Linz offers a developing form of communal 
identity that suggests inclusiveness.27 He studied surveys 
from the Spanish and French Basque regions, Catalonia, 
Galicia, and Valencia and determined that traditional 
nationalist movements offer primordialist conceptions of 
nationalism, rooted in common ancestry and language.
However, often ethnic political movements use a territorial 
definition of identity in their drive for regional autonomy. 
These nationalists shed their ties to their supposed 
historical past, reducing the "tensions imbedded in their 
ethnic ideology," and including "alien" ethnics for 
political expediency.28
Considering the odds against India, with its numerous, 
established ethnic groups, its leaders have succeeded 
because, "since 1947, there has been a tacit understanding 
that if the Indian state is to survive, the government has 
no alternative but to come to terms with—  indeed to 
accommodate—  diversity."29 India abandoned its early
27Juan J. Linz, "From Primordialism to Nationalism" in 
New Nationalisms of the Developed West, eds., Edward A. 
Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski (Boston; Allen and Unwin, 
1985), 203-53.
2SNewman, 471.
29Mayall and Simpson, 14.
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attempts to establish Hindi as its official language, 
particularly due to Tamil pressure.30 Indian "nationality" 
has come to be based upon commitment to a secular state with 
a vast majority of Hindus. Thus, a large part of the Indian 
image of its nationality rests upon the "most flexible (and 
least overtly political) of the great world religions."31
Efforts to create inclusive national communities often 
fail. Ethiopia might reduce ethnic and separatist violence 
by forming a more coherent Ethiopian state, rewriting its 
history to show the common "Hamatic" tradition of Somalis, 
Oromos, Amhars, and Eritreans.32 David Laitin points out 
the advantages of various possible identities, but concludes 
that the colonial experience of the region has rendered them 
impossible.33
The worse case scenario, in constructivist theory, is 
the control of the state by a mono-cultural, intolerant 
authority. In these cases, the dominant culture, in its 
"nation-building" efforts, is insensitive or deliberately
30Ibid.
31Ibid., 15.
32David Laitin, "The Ogaadeen Question and Change in 
Somali Identity," in State Versus Ethnic Claims, eds. Donald 
Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunso (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1983), 339-40.
33Ibid.
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belligerent to alternative ethnic cultures and tries to
enhance the security of the state by eliminating
"alternative foci of loyalty."34
Dominant cultural elites in the society have been 
able to preserve their dominance through the instru­
ment of state power, and, to varying extents, the 
process of the formation of the state has encouraged 
the close link between the ethnic nationalism of the 
dominant group and state nationalism: the cultural 
symbolism of the dominant group thus forming the 
basis for the articulation of state-national 
identity. The ethnic attachments of the dominant 
community in such states is strengthened and trans­
formed by its translation into state nationalism.35
This leaves other ethnies with the choice between
assimilating or resisting. However, as the primordialists
argued, people sacrifice and die for their ethnic identity.
The determination of the dominant culture to absorb or
exterminate minorities creates antithetical ethnic
nationalisms to oppose its efforts.
Summary
Often, inflexible, mono-cultural regimes fall into the 
trap of seeing themselves as forces for modernization and 
integration. They perceive that their concept of the nation
34Ibid.
35David Brown, "Ethnic Revival," Third World Quarterly 
11 (October 1989): 8.
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is the advanced or modern version.36 Alternative ethnic and 
national identities, consequently, must be fragmenting and 
disintegrating forces of primitiveness. Anderson cites 
Indonesia's "bloody integration" of East Timor between 1975 
and 1980 . 37 The regime in Jakarta perceived and portrayed 
its battle as one against "disintegrationist,"
"separatists," and "anti-Indonesian elements." Such 
ideologies encourage leaders to believe, that they stand for 
progress and peace, while their adversaries represent narrow 
nationalism, sectionalism and terrorism.
Two trends emerge from the constructivist school's 
theories on ethnic nationalism and ethnic conflict. First, 
ethnic nationalism arises in opposition to an oppressing 
force. Second, exclusive national identities, those 
legitimizing, defining, and enforcing the nation-state as an 
ethnically homogenous community, promote ethnic conflict.
The history of nationalism shows that opposition 
movements often develop ethnic nationalist ideologies in 
response to Oppression. As Heribert Adam wrote, "People 
establish their identity in opposition to oppressors as the
36This may in part be because of the role of the social 
sciences in examining ethnic conflict and nationalism in
terms of modernity.
37Anderson, "The New World Disorder," 5-6.
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first step to real resistance."38 Americans developed a 
nationalism based upon a revolution against the British 
monarchy. German nationality defined itself in military 
opposition to Napoleon's France. Early nationalists in 
African and Asian colonial territories, organized themselves 
as anti-European identities, and, later, disenfranchised 
ethnicities within these states formed in opposition to 
their central governments.
Constructivist theory emphasizes that nation-states 
must recognize strong identities and accomodate diversity. 
Regardless of the "falseness" or "genuineness" of an 
identity, forceful attempts' to homogenize societies create 
resistance. Ethnic identities opposed to the national 
identity will be reinforced or created in response to 
oppression.
3SHeribert Adam, "The Manipulation of Ethnicity." in 
State Versus Ethnic Claims, eds.., Donald Rothchild and 
Victor Olorunso (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), 
139.
CHAPTER VI
KURDISH ETHNONATIONALISM
Violent Kurdish ethnic nationalism threatens the 
stability and territorial integrities of Iran, Iraq, and 
Turkey. In these states, Kurdish nationalists claim.to 
represent a people that are linguistically and culturally 
distinct from the dominant national groups—  Persians,
Arabs, and Turks, respectively. Thus, they conclude that 
they, deserve their own ethnic state or, at least, 
recognition of their ethnic nationality as distinct.
In each of these states, the Kurdish peoples represent 
a significant portion of the population. Estimates of the 
numbers 'of Kurds are highly controversial, with states 
undercounting and Kurdish nationalists exaggerating. 
Nonetheless, estimates place the Kurdish population between 
18 and 20 million people. Between 4 and 6 million people of 
Kurdish descent live in Iran (out of 50 million citizens), 
and roughly 4 million of Iraq's population (12 million) are 
Kurds. Turkey, with between 8 and 11 million Kurds (in a 
population of 55 million), has the largest population of
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ethnic Kurds.1 Despite the numbers of Kurdish residents 
within these states, neither Iran, Iraq, nor Turkey are 
prepared to grant statehood or even cultural autonomy to 
their Kurdish population.
In spite of long-term efforts by these three states, 
Kurdish nationalism persists as a threat to their stability 
and unity. Since the formation of the Turkish national 
state, its government has brutally suppressed its Kurdish 
people, outlawing their language and using the army to 
enforce martial law throughout the region. Iran has crushed 
several Kurdish rebellions and employed state terrorism 
against Kurdish nationalist writers and elites. Iraq has 
also used state terrorism, including the recent genocidal 
chemical warfare tactics employed in 1988 against the town 
of Halabja where 5000 died.2 Nonetheless, the Kurdish 
resistance movements defy the state authorities.
The Kurds
According to most accounts, the Kurds descended from 
the Medes, an Indo-European population group that moved into
1Joel Krieger, ed., The Oxford Companion to Politics of 
the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 518.
2Nader Entasser, Kurdish Ethnonationalism (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1992), 138.
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the Iranian plateau before 600 BC.3 Like Persians, Pushtus 
and Tajiks, the Kurds are an Iranian people. Historically, 
the term "Kurd" denoted non-Arab nomads, but, by the seventh 
century BC, it referred to all peoples inhabiting the Zagros 
Mountain regions of northwestern Iran.4 The Kurds 
intermingled with other tribes and ethnic groups in the 
area, but their culture has remained distinct from those of 
the surrounding regions.
The region's geography has kept the Kurds separate from 
the Arabs, Persians, and Turks. Kurdistan sits on the 
rugged and mountainous boundaries of the former Ottoman and 
Persian Empires. Historically, both cultures viewed it the 
natural boundary between them.5 Neither culture penetrated 
Kurdistan long enough to assimilate the various tribes that 
lived there, and the Kurds remained separate.
Their mountains, according to the noted scholar Mehrdad 
Izady, define the Kurdish people's identity and culture.6 
The Kurdish saying "Level the mountains and the Kurds will' 
be no more" demonstrates how the mountains have protected
3Mehrdad Izady, The Kurds: A Concise Handbook 
(Washington D.C.: Taylor and Francis, 1992), 3-4.
4Charles MacDonald, "The Kurdish Question in the 
1980s," in Esman and Rabinovich, 234-35.
5Entasser, 3.
6Izady, 186-191.
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the Kurds from outsiders and sustained them throughout their 
history.7 Kurds who have left the mountains are seldom 
considered to be Kurds, while members of other ethnic groups 
that have settled in the mountains have become "kurdified 
beyond all recognition."8
However, just as the mountains have shielded the 
inhabitants of Kurdistan from outside influences, they have 
prevented easy communication among the Kurds themselves. 
There is little communication or trade between Kurdish 
communities. Organization has. tended to remain tribal, and 
the Kurdish language.is divided into numerous dialects, the 
speakers of which can not communicate with other Kurdish 
speakers. Thus, culturally and linguistically, the Kurdish 
society is fragmented and diverse.
The Kurdish Language 
Most.modern nationalist movements recognize common 
language as an important ingredient to the development of an 
ethnic nation. The Kurdish language belongs to the Iranian 
branch of the Indo-European languages and, thus, 
fundamentally differs from the Semetic Arabic and Altaic 
Turkish, and is similar to Persian. It is, however,
7Ibid. , 188-89..
8Ibid.
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distinct from Persian and unintelligible to speakers of that 
language.. The mountainous terrain that isolates Kurdish­
speaking groups and the lack of a central authority to 
standardize the language have reinforced linguistic 
diversity among Kurdish speakers.
Although there exist scores of subdialects, there are 
two main dialects of the Kurdish language: Kurmanji and 
Pahlawan'i (Dimili-Gurani) .9 Kurmanji, some subdialect of 
which is spoken by most Kurds, consists of two main groups 
of subdialects: North Kurmanji (Bahdinani), of which there 
are 15 million speakers in Turkey, Syria, and the Caucuses; 
and South Kurmanji (Sorani), of which there are 6 million 
speakers in Iran and Iraq. North Kurmanji is arguably the 
literary language of the Kurds and is considered the most 
prestigious. Versions of Dimili, also known as Zaza, are 
spoken by roughly 4 million Kurds throughout Iran, Iraq, and 
Anatolia; and Gurani is spoken by the roughly 3 million 
speakers of its two subdivisions, Laki and Awramani.10
These dialects are mutually exclusive and 
unintelligible to speakers of. other dialects of Kurdish. 
Writers of the Kurdish dialects even disagree about a common
9Some scholars refer to the major divisions, of Kurdish 
as languages within a Kurdish family of languages, rather
than as dialects of a single language. See Entasser, 4-5.
10Izady, 167-75.
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alphabet. Kurds in Turkey and Syria publish in the Latin 
alphabet, and many Iranian intellectuals support this 
practice. Most literate Kurds in Iran, however, use the 
Arabic. Additionally the Kurds in Armenia and the Caucuses 
have published in the Armenian alphabet since the 1920s, and 
some Kurds in the former Soviet Union use the Cyrillic 
alphabet.11 Despite the heterogeneity of their language, 
there exists, among Kurdish nationalists, a sense of a 
common language.
Religion
Prior to the influence of Islam, most Kurds followed 
the Persian religion of Zoroastrianism. Now, the majority 
of Kurds are Muslims, three-fifths of whom are practicing 
Sunnis. The Shi’a sect of Islam, Judaism and Christianity 
also have significant followings among the Kurdish people. 
There are followers of the Alawite sect of Islam, considered 
heretical to the orthodox Muslims. Also, there are a number 
of Sufi orders. Additionally, a renewed interest in 
Zoroastrianism developed among intellectuals at the 
beginning of the twentieth century.
“ MacDonald, 238.
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Yazidism, an ancient religion of unknown origins, also 
has a significant following among the Kurds.12 Yazidism, 
referred to as "devil worship" by orthodox Muslims, actually 
professes to be one of several "cults of angels." It is 
exclusive to Kurdistan and has only nominal roots, in Islam, 
Christianity, Judaism, and eastern religions, but its rights 
and practices are wholly foreign to Muslims.
The History of Kurdish Nationalism 
The modern Kurdish movements in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey 
have persisted as problems for the central governments, but 
only posed serious threats to them when historical 
circumstances or external forces weakened the states. The 
heterogeneity of the Kurdish language, regionalism due to 
Kurdistan's terrain, political divisions among Kurdish 
leaders, and the Kurds' inability to unite at opportunistic 
times have allowed the central governments to recover and 
stabilize their regimes. After infighting among the Kurds 
or the withdrawal of outside support further weakens them, 
the threatened state usually responds with brute force 
against Kurdish civilians and soldiers.
12for discussion of the angel cults among the Kurds see
Izady, 137-58.
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Kurdish nationalism began with the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century.13 The 1920 
Treaty of Sevres envisioned a Kurdistan granted local 
autonomy with the prospect of independence within a year, if 
the local population desired it and the League of Nations 
Council recommended independence. Though the Treaty of 
Sevres was never ratified, the aspirations that it aroused 
■persist today, represented in violent ethnic conflict in 
Kurdistan.
Under Ottoman rule, Kurdish rebellion existed as 
resistance to the central authority, rather than as ethnic 
nationalism. The revolts of the Baban (1806-8), of Badr 
Khan (1843-47), and Mir Muhammad (1883-6) against the Turks, 
and the revolt of Sheikh Ubaidella against the Persians were 
"essentially revolts of traditional rulers who resented the 
increasing encroachments on their authority."14 Although 
Ubaidellah tried to use nationalist rhetoric to find allies, 
all these conflicts arose from indignation caused by
13Martin van Bruinessen, "Kurdish Tribes and the State 
of Iran," in The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and 
Afghanistan. ed. Richard Tapper (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1983), 370-76. He discusses the relations of Kurdish 
tribes to the Ottoman state as the beginnings of Kurdish 
separatism.
14Arthur Campbell Turner, "Kurdish Nationalism,” in 
Ideology and Power in the Middle East, eds. Peter Chelkowski 
and Robert J. -Pranger (London: Duke University Press, 1988), 
387 .
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taxation, conscription and Kurdish leaders being treated as 
lesser partners.15
Nationalism is a Western concept and was alien to the 
cultures under Ottoman domination. The Ottoman Empire based 
its unity upon the common religion of Islam, or "Ottoman 
Harmony," a "view of the world and of history which was 
shared by different religions and linguistic communities of 
t h e .empire. "16 However, some intellectual Kurds, exposed to 
European ideas, promoted nationalism as a means to preserve 
their culture. The newspaper, Kurdistan, began publication 
in 18 98 and Kurdish political and literary societies and 
clubs were formed.17 Some secret societies called for 
Kurdish independence, but had little effect without the 
support of the powerful tribal chiefs.18
The close of World War I offered an opportunity for an 
independent Kurdistan that ended with the disappointment of 
the new Kurdish nationalist movement. The influences of the
15Ibid.
16Yves Besson, "Identity crisis as a paradigm of Middle 
Eastern conflictuality," International Social Science 
Journal 43 (February 1991): 137. Nationalism was a threat 
to the Ottoman Empire and was the primary force responsible 
for its collapse.
17Izady, 59.
18Marion Farouk-Sluggett and Peter Sluggett, Iraq Since 
1958 (London: I.B. Taurus, 1987), 178.
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defeated Ottomans and the occupied Persians over Kurdistan 
evaporated and encouraged Kurdish nationalists to push for 
autonomy. However, Reza Shah took over the Iranian 
rulership in 1921 and Mustafa Kemal's successful war of 
independence re-established authority in Istanbul.
Kurdish hopes for an independent Kurdistan were further 
damaged when the British created the Arab-dominated state of 
Iraq and included the oil-rich province of Mosul. They 
incorporated the largely Kurdish region within the new 
state. The Baghdad government would have had to respect the 
Kurdish autonomy mandated by the Treaty of Sevres, but the 
Allies and Kemal renegotiated the treaty and dropped the 
issue of Kurdish independence in the Treaty of Lausanne.
In the post-war period, there were numerous small-scale 
Kurdish revolts against the central governments in Iran,
Iraq, and Turkey. The fighting was most brutal in Turkey, 
where the Turkish government attempted to "turkify" its 
Kurds and mold the new state into an ethnically homogenous 
nation-state, fitting the internationally legitimate 
standard. Although the Treaty of Lausanne required the 
Turkish government to guarantee the religious rights of non- 
Muslims and the freedom of speech for non-Turks, the Turks 
declared their nation the Republic of Turkey.19 They banned
19Izady, 61.
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all Kurdish organizations, including religious 
organizations, and Kurdish publications.
Sheikh' Said led the first major revolt against the 
central authorities in 1925, and was crushed by the Turkish 
Republican A m y .  Other major resistance efforts by the 
Kurds occurred during the Khoyboun revolt, which was crushed 
in 1932, and the rebellion in the region of Darsim in 1937. 
It was also put down with great ferocity.20
Two revolts in Iraq demonstrate the difficulties for 
Kurdish nationalist movements during this period. In 1922, 
Shayk Mahmud declared himself the king of an independent 
Kurdistan under the banner of the "Free Kurdistan Movement." 
For the most part, though, he was unable to assert his rule 
outside his home district of Sulaymania.21 Besides fighting 
British and Iraqi forces, he had to deal with Kurdish tribal 
chiefs that opposed his authority, and Kurdish intellectuals 
who denounced him as "feudal."22 Shayk Mahmud's revolt 
resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Sadabad, in which 
Iraq, Turkey, and Iran agreed to coordinate defense policies 
against internal and external threats.23
20Sluggett, 180.
21Sluggett, 179 and Entasser, 52-54.
22Izady, 64.
23Entasser, 54.
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In 1927, Shayk Ahmad, a religious leader, began a 
rebellion against British, Turkish, and Iraqi forces. He 
too faced the resistance of Kurdish dissenters. He promoted 
a new religion, which combined Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam, as a mechanism to unify the Kurds, but was 
unsuccessful.24 Eventually, British and Iraqi troops chased 
him to Turkey, where Turkish forces captured and arrested 
him. Leadership of the Barzani clan’s military forces 
passed to Ahmad's brother, Mustafa Barzani.
The Republic of Mahabad
The 1945 Republic of Mahabad, backed by the Soviets, 
offered another chance at a Kurdish ethnic nation.25 After 
the occupation of Iran in 1940 by the British and the 
Soviets, the Iranian Kurdish movement seized the opportunity 
of the government's weakness to declare its independence. 
President Qazi Muhammad assumed the republic's civilian 
leadership, and Mustafa Barzani travelled from Iraq to join 
as its military leader.
The republic, however, lacked the ability to survive 
without Soviet backing. When Moscow withdrew its support, 
in exchange for promises of oil concessions from Teheran,
24Izady, 64.
25Sluggett, 183-86.
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Iranian national forces attacked and crushed the Kurdish 
resistance.26 They captured and executed Qazi Muhammad and 
Barzani fled to the USSR.27 The republic had lasted only 
one year.
The Post Republic Era: The KDP in Iraq 
Barzani returned to Iraq in 1958 after a group of army 
officers led by Colonel Abdul Karim Qasim overthrew the 
monarchy in Baghdad,. The new government had a uneasy truce 
with Barzani and his Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). It 
used the Kurds against its foes, the Arab nationalists, the 
Ba'thists, and the communists. Barzani used the truce to 
increase his authority among Iraqi Kurds.23 Qasim, who was 
rumored to be an arabized Kurd, consolidated his power and 
began to perceive Barzani as a threat to the regime.29 He 
negotiated with Barzani's Kurdish rivals, most notably Jalal 
Talabani and his Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and
2SEdmund Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question in Iraq
(Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 12.
27Turner, 400.
28Entasser, 59.
29Izady, 67. The officer's rebellion leaders were 
originally friendly, if not openly sympathetic to the 
Kurdish cause. However, the arab nationalists among them 
could not have' supported any change that would have weakened 
the Iraqi state. Sluggett, 188.
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sought to neutralize the KDP. The two sides fought to a 
standstill until they signed a cease-fire in 1963, agreeing 
to cooperate against the Ba'thists and Arab nationalists.
In 1963, an alliance between the Ba'thists and other 
anti-Qasim forces overthrew Qasim. The new president, Abdul 
, Salam Aref, a non-Ba'thist, promised the KDP Kurdish 
autonomy within the framework of an Iraqi state, in order to 
gain time to put down the communists. Leftist elements 
within the KDP, accusing Barzani of being.too "feudal," 
thwarted attempts to improve relations with the shaky 
regime.30 Aref, accusing the KDP of making impossible 
demands, sent the Iraqi army north to attack. Barzani, to 
strengthen his authority within the KDP, accepted arms from 
the Iranian government.31 Because of this tactic, Barzani 
was viewed as a stooge of the Shah. After he established 
close ties with Iran, it became less likely that Kurdish 
rights could be recognized "within the framework of an Iraqi 
state."
When the Ba'thists overthrew Aref's government in 1968, 
they also sought a truce with the Kurds in order to 
consolidate their power. As happened during Aref's rule, 
the Iraqi government and the Kurds could not agree upon
30Entasser, 65.
31Turner, 4 01.
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terms and returned to armed struggle.32 The Ba'thists had 
the backing of the Soviets, while the KDP received weapons 
from the CIA, Israel and Iran.
Unfortunately for the KDP, their powerful allies only 
supported them as a means to destabilize the Iraqi 
government.33 They considered outright Kurdish victory 
undesirable, since it would incite nationalist sympathies 
among Iranian Kurds. After the Shah signed the Algiers 
Agreement in 1975, he stopped supporting the Kurds. The 
Ba'th government, bolstered by its rapprochement with 
Teheran, attacked the unsupported Kurds.34 It destroyed 
Kurdish villages, arresting and killing civilians and began 
a policy of "arabization" of its Kurdish regions. Once 
again, Kurdish hopes had been raised, only to end in 
brutality against civilians.
The Iranian Revolution
The 197 9 Iranian revolution presented the Iranian Kurds 
with their first opportunity for independence since the
32Although they signed an agreement- that the Kurdish 
language would have the status of a national language 
alongside Arabic and that there would be a Kurdish Vice 
President, neither side took this agreement seriously. 
Entasser, 70.
33Entasser, 71.
34Izady, 68.
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Mahabad Republic. The long-suppressed Kurdish Democratic 
Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Komala took advantage of the 
chaos in Teheran to create a local autonomous zone for 
Iranian Kurdistan. Once the Islamic Republic re-established 
order, it moved against the Kurds.35 Claiming that the KDPI 
and the Komala were attempting to dismember Iran, it 
discredited them as anti-Islamic.36 It allied with other 
Kurds, including Barzani and some tribal chiefs, and 
attacked. Teheran was willing to accept minority rights for 
religious groups, but unwilling to grant rights based upon 
non-Islamic principles.
The Iran-Iraq War
Although it brutally suppressed its own Kurdish 
nationalists, the Iranian government supported Iraq's Kurds 
against Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq War. After Iraq 
attacked Iran in 1980, the KDP, with its headquarters in 
Teheran, received arms and the support of the Iranian army. 
Although the war bogged down in the south, Iran's most 
successful offensives were aided by Kurds in the North.
In desperation, Saddam Hussein promised the KDP's rival 
Kurdish group, Talabani's PUK, terms that were more generous
35Izady, 69.
36Ghareeb, 16-17.
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than those Barzani had been given in 1970—  regional 
autonomy in northern Iraq and a budget equivalent to 25-30 
percent-of' the Iraqi state budget.37 It is doubtful that 
Hussein planned to keep his promise, but the alliance helped 
him counter the Iranians.38
After the war ended in 1988, Hussein sought revenge 
upon the Kurds. Iraqi troops fought the KDP, employing a 
"scorched earth" policy against its Kurdish regions. They 
bulldozed and dynamited buildings, poured cement down wells, 
and used chemical weapons. In the most gruesome use of 
chemical weapons since World War I, the Iraqis killed 5000 
civilians in the city of Halabja in 1988 .39 The Kurdish 
insurrection collapsed within a year.
The Gulf War
The Allied victory during the 1991 Gulf War, began the 
most recent era of Kurdish nationalism. Following the 
Ba'thist's defeat, a coalition of Kurds, including the KDP 
and the PUK who were tentatively allied, seized control of 
the Kurdish regions of'Iraq, while the Iraqi Republican 
Guard was busy suppressing a Shiite rebellion in the south.
37Izady, 69.
38Entasser, 132.
39Ibid., 138.
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As soon as it finished, however, it attacked the Kurds. It 
crushed coalition forces, while nearly 1.2 million refugees 
fled to Iran and 500,000 fled towards Turkey.40 The Allied 
forces, mostly British and American, tried to stop the mass 
retreat' and genocide, establishing a no-fly zone north of 
the 36th parallel. Within this region, the Kurdish 
coalition declared a Kurdish Federated State under the 
leadership of the PUK and the KDP.
To the chagrin of the West and its ally Turkey, the 
declared Kurdish Federated State has encouraged Kurdish 
nationalism in that state. In Turkey, Turgot Ozal had 
reversed the government's lifelong policy of oppression 
towards its Kurds. It no longer insisted that Kurds were 
"Mountain Turks," and, in February of 1991, it granted them 
linguistic rights.41 Also, it recognized the celebration of 
the Iranian New Year (Newrozl. the most important Kurdish 
holiday.
Despite the relative relaxation of its Kurdish policy 
in the state, the main Kurdish nationalist movement in 
Turkey, the PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan— Kurdish 
Worker's Party) grew. Formed in 1979, the PKK gained 
strength from Turkish government suppression. Ankara,
40Izady, 70.
41Christian Science Monitor (February 7 1991), p. 5.
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hoping to destroy the Marxist guerilla movement, raised 
local Kurdish militias against it. The brutality of the 
police and the militia, forced local civilians to chose 
between the government and the PKK. Many chose, the PKK.42
The post-Gulf War rise of Kurdish ethnic nationalism 
has proven to be a greater challenge to the Turkish 
government than to the war's loser, Saddam Hussein.43 The 
existence of a de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq has 
aroused nationalist sentiments among Turkey's southeastern 
Kurdish populace. Also, PKK guerrillas have used the no-fly 
zone as a hideout from which to launch attacks against the 
Turkish government. The Turkish army has repeatedly had to 
send forces into northern Iraq after them.
While the foreign ministers of Turkey, Iran, and Syria 
(a long-time supporter of the PKK) agreed to coordinate 
their policies toward Kurdish nationalism, the leadership of 
the Kurds is not unified.44 Abdullah Oc.alan, the leader of
42Eric Rouleau, "The Challenges to Turkey," Foreign 
Affairs 72 (October 1993): 124.
■43James Brown, "Turkey's Kurdish Imbroglio," Annals 541 
(September 1995): 116-29. Brown argues that Turkey 
ultimately may suffer more from post-Gulf War changes than 
Iraq.
44Robert Olson, "The Kurdish Question and Geopolitic 
and Geostrategic Changes in the Middle East after the Gulf 
War," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 17
(Summer 1994): 46.
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the PKK has denounced both Masoud Barzani (Mustafa's son) 
and Talabani as traitors to all Kurds.45 The leaders of the 
Kurdish Federated State, for their part, have cooperated 
with the Turkish government in its fight against the PKK, 
disdaining the use of their autonomous zone for use against 
Turkey, whose Incirlik Air Base is essential to the 
maintenance of the protection zone.46
Summary
The history of Kurdish nationalism has been the 
repetition of a pattern which is not likely to end. Kurdish 
nationalists have only had success in Iran, Iraq, or Turkey 
during periods of instability for the central government. 
During chaotic periods, the governments in Teheran, Baghdad, 
Ankara, or Istanbul have used different tactics to reduce 
the threat of Kurdish nationalism. They have negotiated 
temporary truces with Kurdish movements, which the Kurdish 
leaders accepted in order to strengthen themselves within 
Kurdistan. The Kurds have been unable to unify and the 
central governments have reasserted their authority. Also,, 
they have fostered feuds among the Kurdish leaders. Kurdish 
interests have fought among themselves or allowed themselves
45Christian Science Monitor. 13 August 1991, 4.
4601son, 48-49.
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to be used by outside powers against whichever group 
appeared to lead Kurdish ethnic nationalism- When the 
central governments re-established authority, they renege 
upon any promises made during times of instability and take 
revenge upon Kurdish groups, and civilians.
CHAPTER VII
THE KURDS AND THREE' APPROACHES TO ETHNICITY
The two dominant schools of ethnic conflict, the 
conflictual modernizationists and the primordialists, 
provide insight into the forces that exacerbate the ethnic 
violence in Kurdistan. .Conflictual modernizationists- 
identify the economic disparities between the peoples of the 
Kurdistan and their respective economic centers in Iran, 
Iraq, and Turkey as factors that deepen ethnic hatred.1 
Likewise, the primordialists make a case for strong, valued 
Kurdish, Persian, Arab, and Turkish identities that command 
deep, psychological loyalties.2 Although they have 
identified forces that worsen the conflict and hinder its 
resolutions, neither school isolates the root causes of the 
conflicts.
Uoane Nagel, "The Conditions of Ethnic Separatism: The 
Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Iraq," Ethnicity 7 (September 
1980): 279-97.
throughout Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Horowitz 
portrays the Kurds in Iraq as a prime example of a 
stigmatized "backwards" identity and a prime candidate for 
secessionism.
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The constructivist approach to ethnic conflicts reveals 
the source of violence.in Kurdistan and accounts for factors 
that thwart the unification of the Kurds. The inability of 
Iran, Iraq, and Turkey to create national communities that 
include the Kurds, and these states' suppressions of the 
Kurdish identity caused Kurdish nationalism. However, the 
Kurds have been unable to unify because of their linguistic 
and religious diversity, and their divided leadership. The 
governments have utilized this disunity to counter the 
threat to their states and ethnic violence has persisted.
An examination of economic variables that influence 
ethnic conflict illustrates important factors in the 
persistence of violence in Kurdistan. The dependency model 
of regionally-differentiated ethnic groups describes the 
conditions among Kurds. They suffer from economic 
discrimination along ethnic lines and, thus, justify their 
demands for autonomy in terms of economic grievances.
However, evidence shows that the conflictual 
modernizationists misinterpret the situation in Kurdistan. 
First, conflictual modernization theory assumes that ethnic 
conflict results from attempts to re-establish social order 
after traditional structures have collapsed under the 
pressures of modernization. In Kurdistan, however, 
traditional social structures have remained intact, and are
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the sources of power for many ethnic elites. Second, the 
conflictual modernizationists suppose that disgruntled, 
modernized elites will.politicize ethnicity. This 
assumption ignores the importance of traditional elites who 
oppose assimilation in Iraq and Iran and who cooperate in 
Turkey. Finally, the conflict between Kurds and their 
ethnic neighbors began prior to the modernizing influences 
of state programs and, thus, could not have resulted from 
modernization. While the conflictual modernizationist 
scenario approximates events in Kurdistan, it fails to 
account for the origins of ethnic violence.
Ethnic identities in the Middle East are ancient and 
well-developed. Primordialists claim that such identities 
have a psychological strength that defies rational, economic 
explanations. The Kurdish, Persian, Arab, and Turkish 
identities involved'in the violence in Kurdistan consist of 
the ethnic markers that primordialists claim will command 
loyalty and self-sacrifice. The psychological appeal of 
ethnic organization in the region and the willingness to die 
for, or commit atrocities in defense of these identities 
plays an important role in'the' violence in the region.
However, while primordialists explain the irrational 
destructiveness of the violence and its tendency to persist 
over generations, they offer no suggestions concerning the
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cause of conflict. Well-developed, differentiated cultures 
do not, of themselves, necessitate violent conflict. Thus, 
theorists that apply primordialist explanations to ethnic 
conflict must resort to economic explanations to account for 
the origins of violence. Neither of the two dominant 
schools reveals the source of the conflict in Kurdistan.
Conflictual Modernization and the Kurds 
Of the two competition models, the ecology model and 
the dependency model, the latter best describes the 
conditions among the Kurdish peoples in the peripheries of 
Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. Direct economic competition, 
proposed by the ecology model, does not apply to the Kurds. 
Kurds who leave Kurdistan to join the central economies of 
Iran, Iraq, and Turkey usually assimilate to the dominant 
cultures. According to Izady, "the list of naturally 
assimilated Kurds is a long one."3 Karim Sanjabi, the 
leader of the National Front Party in Iran, President Qasim 
in Iraq, and General Kenan Evren in Turkey are only some 
examples of Kurds who have shed their ethnic identity and 
succeeded within the dominant cultures.4 Most of the ethnic
3Izady, 110.
4Ibid., 110. Saddam Hussein himself is partly Kurdish 
through his father's family.
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violence in the Kurdish conflict relates to the core­
periphery relationships between the Persian, Arab, and 
Turkish centers and the peripheries in Kurdistan.
Dependency theory's depiction of regionally different 
rates of modernization describes conditions in Iran, Iraq, 
and Turkey. The Kurdish regions in all three states suffer 
from economic underdevelopment relative to the regions of 
the dominant ethnic groups.5 The policies of the central 
governments have prevented the Kurds from benefitting from 
the natural resources of Kurdistan. Petroleum refinement, 
the most valuable export, has been developed to the 
advantage of the central economies. At the Kirkuk and 
Khanaqin refineries in Iraq, and the Batman refinery in 
Turkey, for example, the only help to the local economy is 
jobs for unskilled laborers.6 The exportable, manufactured 
goods of Kurdistan are limited to souvenir handicrafts and 
artwork.7
In Iran, uneven modernization during the Pahlavi 
monarchy resulted in ethnic inequality. The government took 
control of agriculture, pushing Kurds and other peasants off 
of their land. 'Periphery ethnies provided the low-paid,
sNagel, 280-81.
6Izady, 232.
7Ibid., 231.
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unskilled labor force employed in the monarchy's housing- 
construction and road-building projects.8 As a result, \ 
Kurds have remained poorer and less educated than Persians.\ 
Only 2 0 percent of the homes in Kurdish regions have 
electricity, compared to 87 percent in Persian regions, and 
the Kurdish literacy rate is only 30 percent compared to. 66 
percent in Persian provinces.9
The Ba'thist government's main development projects in 
Iraqi Kurdistan have been limited to the construction of 
"cluster villages" and roads. Kurdish intellectuals have 
criticized these projects as self-interested on the part of 
Baghdad. According to critics, the government built the 
"cluster villages" of compact housing for the residents of 
Kurdistan.only to isolate the guerrillas from the local 
populace, and to facilitate the monitoring of the Kurds.10 
The roads ease the mobilization of the Iraqi army against 
the Kurdish rebels.
The situation is similar in Turkey, where, the rapid 
economic.growth that benefitted the cities on the Aegean and
8Entasser,' 6-7.
9Akbar Aghajanian, "Ethnic Inequality in Iran," 
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 15 (May
1983): 216. in Entasser, 7.
10Entasser, 8.
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Mediterranean coasts bypassed the rural southeast.11 The 
per capita GDP of Kurdish regions is less than half the
*national average and unemployment is estimated at 25 
percent, twice the national average. In a state where the 
literacy rate is 77 percent, the literacy rate among the 
Kurds is only 48 percent.12
The people inhabiting the Kurdish regions of Iran,
Iraq, and Turkey suffer from economic hardship distributed 
along ethnic lines, a cultural division of labor. The Kurds 
have few avenues for economic advancement. Their regions 
are comparatively "backwards" and feudal. These conditions 
foster the sense of a prosperous center "colonizing" and 
exploiting the poverty-stricken periphery.
Despite the animosity caused by economic differences 
between ethnies, the dependency model misinterprets the 
source#of the conflict. Competition theorists assume that 
economic disparity and competition cause conflict. Once 
they find a "core-periphery" relationship, they assume that 
they have found the source of conflict. Joane Nagel, a 
conflictual modernizationist, tried to explain the ethnic 
conflict in Kurdistan with dependency theory, but could not
u Philip Robins, "The Overlord State: Turkish policy 
and the Kurdish issue," International Affairs 69 (October
1993): 663.
12Ibid., 663.
account for the persistence of violence there in terms of 
economic variables.13 She resorted to citing the level of 
organization among Kurds, and extra-national involvement in 
the conflict to supplement the dependency model's 
explanation of persistent separatism among Kurds.14 
Although economic differentiation provides Kurdish rebels 
with grievances against the central governments, it is not 
the source of the conflict.
The Destruction of Social Order 
Conflictual modernization theory assumes that 
modernization destroys traditional social order. 
Accordingly, old structures of authority recede in 
importance during modernization. Elites must compete for 
positions of political power,, while economic displacement 
makes nonelites susceptible to appeals to ethnic identity. 
Ethnic elites politicize ethnicity for their own purposes, 
and nonelites follow. However, modernization and the 
destruction of social order has not occurred in Kurdistan.
13Nagel, 279-97.
14Ibid., 289-93. As shall be discussed later, 
organization (disorganization) among the Kurdish, separatists 
benefits the central governments and militates against 
persistence by the separatists.
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The Kurdish regions of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey remain much as 
they were before the creation of these states.
The economic infrastructure of Kurdistan has only
changed slightly and its pre-modern social structure remains
intact. After the 1932 Shayk Mahmud revolt was put down,
tribal leaders asserted their political primacy in the
absence of local competition. They formed.political parties
and guerrilla forces. Kurdish leaders use names that imply
modern political parties, but their legitimacy as rulers
depends upon their authority as tribal and clan leaders.
Almost anyone of political importance carries a 
tribal surname. Jalal Talabani, Mustafa Barzani,
Masoud Barzani, Rasul Mamand, and Abdul-Rahman 
Qassemlou all of whom carry the names of their 
respective tribes are only the best known.15
The highest focus of loyalty for the majority of Kurds
remains the traditional tribal political structures.
The governments of Iran and Turkey have undermined, to 
some extent, the. traditional structures of authority in 
their Kurdish regions, and the Kurdish resistance movements 
there reflect the differences relative to the conditions in 
Iraq. The KDPI in Iran is less tribal than either the KDP 
or the PUK. It is made up of mostly urban el-ites, but 
maintains its ties to the traditional tribal structures,
15Izady, 205.
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which remain intact within Iranian Kurdistan.16 The Komala 
is a more modern, socialist organization, but, like other 
leftist and moderately leftist organizations, it has also 
needed its connections with tribal structures. Although 
they are less dependent upon the tribal leadership, the 
Kurdish movements in Iran benefit from the intact structures 
of traditional order.17
In Turkey, the government has supported some 
traditional structures while undermining others. The 
Kurdish regions of the Turkish Republic remain semi- 
feudal.18 The government backs local Kurdish landlords and 
recruits the Village Guards from among clans that remain 
loyal to the state.19 According to a Turkish military 
officer, "Half the men join the PKK. The other half move to 
the cities where they become militia."20 Kurdish loyalties 
remain divided between their commitment to clan structures 
and the appeal of the modern, Marxist PKK.
The PKK is the only Kurdish political party that is 
independent of tribal structures. It fights against the
16Ibid., 207 .
17Ibid., 210.
18Robins, 663.
19Ibid., 664 .
20Rouleau, 124.
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Turkish-organized Village Guards and its Marxist-Leninist 
ideology is aimed as much at the defeat of local landlords 
as the Turkish government.21 Its leader and founder,
Abdullah Ocalan, denounced the feudalism of both Barzani and 
Talabani in Iraq, calling them traitors to all Kurds.22 
Nonetheless, even in Turkey, the pre-modern social 
structures play an important role in the conflict.23
Nagel notes the difficulties of explaning ethnic 
separatism' in Kurdistan by the destruction of social order 
through penetration of the periphery. According to their 
theory, conflictual modernizationists expect that "the 
greater the degree of penetration of a peripheral ethnic 
group by the central state, the greater the likelihood the 
group will engage in separatist action."24 However, 
separatist violence in Kurdistan occurs in the absence of 
penetration.
21Michael Gunter "The Kurdish Problem in Turkey,"
Middle East Journal (Summer 1988): 392-98. Gunter credits 
the outlawed status of both Kurdish nationalists and leftist 
organizations for the leftist leanings of Kurdish 
nationalism, since both ideologies can alternatively be used 
to oppose the Turkish state.
22Christian Science Monitor. 13 August 1991, 4-. ^
23Van Bruinessen, 372. Van Bruinessen notes the
importance of the tribal leaders and the maintenance of 
tribal structures to the government's indirect rule of the 
region.
24Nagel, 285.
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It was the moment of greatest weakness, not strong 
penetration, that the Kurds chose to launch their 
republic (Mahabad)—  a strategically wise move that 
indicates the limited usefulness of penetration 
(modernization) explanations of separatism.25
Conflictual modernizationist assumptions of the
destruction of old order as a pre-condition of conflict miss
the importance of the tribal and clan leaders in the ethnic
violence in Kurdistan. Modernization and the displacement
of traditional leaders has not occurred to the extent
necessary to cause ethnic conflict. Kurdish nationalist
leaders are not vying for new positions of authority within
a enlarged polity. Rather, for the most part, they rely
upon old structures of power as a means to resist the
central governments.
Elites and Their Motives 
As shown by the persistence of tribal and feudal 
structures, the makeup of the Kurdish ethnonationalist 
elites defy the descriptions of the conflictual 
modernization theorists. The disgruntled elites of Smith's 
The Ethnic Revival, and the economically-motivated elites of 
Rogowski's rational-choice model are not present in 
Kurdistan.
25Ibid., 289.
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Although they are Western-educated, it is inaccurate to 
portray Kurdish elites as disgruntled bureaucrats. The most 
important leaders of Kurdish resistance movements all 
received degrees from modern universities. However, except 
for possibly Ocalan, they did not fail to find positions of 
authority within the state and decide to incite ethnic 
unrest. Rather, they used their familiarity with Western 
ideas to enhance their existing authority as leaders and to 
increase their ability to resist the central governments.
Ocalan most closely fits the modernized•ethnic elite 
envisioned in The Ethnic -Revival. He formed the PKK after 
gaining an education in Political Science at the University 
of Ankara. While he did not fail as a bureaucrat, he 
apparently felt a sense of discrimination against Kurds 
while at college and began criticizing Turkish oppression.26 
He was jailed for his opinions and turned to promoting 
ethnic separatism.
Only the dominant Kurdish movement in Turkey reflects 
the conflictual modernizationists' portrayal of likely 
ethnic leaders. The motivations of Kurdish elites do not 
match the materialist motivations of their scenarios. An 
insightful comment of Paul Brass applies to the situation in 
Kurdistan.
26Mango, 988.
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The objective or subjective perception of inequality 
is indispensable to justify nationalism, but it is 
not in itself a^explanation for it. The only 
certainty is tfo>pvery nationalist movement has 
always justifie pbelf in terms of existing oppres­
sion by a rivalry roup.27
Kurdish nationalists use economic grievances to justify the 
conflict, but such grievances are not the source of the 
dispute.
Modernization as an Influential Variable in the Conflict
The changes associated with modernization exacerbate 
and promote ethnic conflict in Kurdistan, rather than cause 
it. The Kurds suffer from a cultural division of labor, and 
the economic disparities between the people of Kurdistan and 
their respective economic centers worsen the relations 
between them and the Persians, Arabs, and Turks. Kurds from 
regions of high unemployment and little industrialization 
have had little to lose economically by joining their 
traditional leadership or the PKK against the central 
governments. Economic oppression accounts for much of the 
appeal of the Kurdish movements and, certainly, explains 
some of the appeal of the leftist Komala and PKK.
The social structures of pre-modern Kurdistan remain 
largely intact and Kurdish nationalists utilize them to
27Brass, 43.
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continue their struggles. The PKK fights the feudal 
landowners and the militia as well as the Turkish 
government. The KDPI and the Komala rely upon the support 
of tribal leaders, while the KDP and PUK, despite their 
modern-sounding party names, consist of traditional leaders.
While economic variables account for important aspects 
of the ethnic conflict, the Kurdish violence precedes 
modernization. This fact casts doubts ugon its influence as 
the sources of the dispute. Kurdish leaders resisted the 
central authorities prior to governmental road building and 
industrialization. In Iran and Turkey, Kurdish revolts 
began under the leadership of Ismail Agha Simko28 and Shayk 
Said, respectively, before Reza Kahn and Mustafa Kemal had 
even fully established control over their states.29 In 
Iraq, King Faisal, who was installed as the state's first 
monarch, complained of ethnic sentiments among the Kurds in 
the Mosul region, and said that there "is not yet an Iraq or 
an Iraqi people"30
The conflict broke out before the modern states were 
formed and before the differential impact of modernization
icould have affected ethnic relations. Although the
28See Van Bruinessen.
29Entasser, 12 and Izady, 61.
30Ghareeb, 2.
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conflictual modernizationists identify and analyze economic 
backwardness and economic disparity as forces that promote 
persistent ethnic violence in Kurdistan, these are not the 
causes. Scholars of ethnic conflict must look to the 
constructivist school to find the sources of the conflict.
Primordialism and the Kurds
Like conflictual modernizationist theory, primordialist 
theory receives a mixed review for its description of 
Kurdish ethnic conflict. "Kurdishness" offers an example of 
an identity that commands the strong, "irrational" loyalties 
that are prominent in the primordialists discussions.
However, the loyalties of ordinary Kurds are not focused 
upon an ethnic Kurdish nation. Although it enhances the 
understanding of the persistent, ethnically-motivated 
violence, primordialist theory lacks explanations for the 
initial cause of the conflict.
History has left the Kurds a legacy that is 
characteristic of the stereotypes that are outlined in 
Horowitz's Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Writers have 
described them as backwards, or hillbillies, and, yet, 
fiercely proud. They are portrayed as independent, war-like 
and rugged.31 Supposedly, they value self-sufficiency and
31Izady, 186 and 207
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disdain civilization. This type of ethnic identity is the 
kind that primordialists argue encourages powerful, 
"irrational" loyalties.
Their valued, "backwards" characteristics condition the 
conflict between the Kurds and their .ethnic neighbors.
Their independent, warrior lifestyle is reinforced by 
examples of the resistance of the peshmeraa (those who face 
death) to the central authorities in Teheran, Baghdad, and
Ankara. Even the infighting among Kurds, attributable to            •
their reputation as hillbillies with an affinity for 
feuding,'strengthens the "unique" qualities of 
"Kurdishness," while it weakens their ability to unite.
Kurds perceive the threat to their valued identity, an 
important source of pride to Kurds who have little economic 
success to bolster their collective sense of worth, as a 
threat to themselves. Military success fighting the 
Persians, Arabs, or Turks is a glorification of 
"Kurdishness," while economic achievement is a sign of 
assimilation and submission. Thus, the defense of their 
Kurdish identity has a psychological imperative that 
accounts for some the destructive nature of the war and the 
willingness of .the peshmeraa to sacrifice their lives.
On the other hand, it is. questionable whether the 
psychological affinity for their "Kurdish" identity is
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channelled to an unified, ethnic Kurdistan. Although 
Kurdish nationalists and intellectuals have promoted the 
concept of a single Kurdistan, ordinary Kurds have_ given
their loyalties to their tribal leaders, who have often
mobilized them against other Kurds. Kurd versus Kurd ^  
fighting is as bloody and persistent as any in the region.32 
Far from a common commitment to a unified identity, many 
refer to greater Kurdistan as "the five parts," lacking an 
expression for the single whole.33 Primordialists who study 
the Kurdish identity may determine that the local Kurds 
actually demonstrate loyalty to more basic identities, such 
as a Dimili or Gurani linguistic identity, or membership in 
the Barzani or Talabani clan.
Regardless of the operational level of the conflicting 
primordial identities, the existence of psychologically- 
valued identities does not necessitate violence. The Kurds, 
Persians, Arabs, and Turks (to name only a few of the many 
ethnies in the region) have well-developed cultural 
identities. However, a personal attachment to "Kurdishness" 
does not, in -itself, conflict with the existence of other 
ethnic groups, such as Arabs. Nor, for example, does an 
attachment to "Turkishness" require aggressiveness toward
.32Christian Science Monitor. 24 October 1991, 5.
33MacDonald, 237 .
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Kurds. Thus, primordialism identifies a reason for the 
defense of one's identity group, without explaining the 
beginnings of animosities between groups. For lack of 
guidance from their own theory, the primordialists must rely 
on the variables provided in other theories.
The primordialists and the conflictual 
modernizationists identify aspects of the Kurdish ethnic 
conflict in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey that influence its 
persistence and violence. The strong, primordial identities 
of the ethnies involved in the conflict and the economic 
hardships that Kurds suffer account for the animosities 
between the Kurds and their neighbors, and for the intensity 
of the fighting. These influences worsen and complicate the 
ethnic conflict but did not cause it.
Constructivism and the Kurds 
The constructivists school identifies the sources of 
ethnonationalist violence in the Kurdish regions of Iran, 
Iraq and Turkey. The national self-perceptions of these 
three- states excludes the Kurds from the imagined national 
communities. Simultaneously, these states have remained 
unwilling to part with their Kurdish regions and suffer 
disintegration. The example of Kurdish ethnic conflict
*6
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shows that the constructivist interpretation of ethnic 
conflict is a key to the understanding of ethnonationalism.
In addition to discovering the source of the conflict 
in the history of the development of the Kurdish, Persian, 
Arab, and Turkish national identities, the constructivist 
school introduces variables that increase the understanding 
of ethnic conflict. An examination of each relationship 
between the Kurds and their respective central government 
reveals how national identities and their proponents 
affected the ethnic conflict.
Exclusionary State Policies: Iran. Iraq' and Turkey
In Iran, Reza Shah attempted to mold his state after 
the internationally-legitimate, ethnically-homogenous model, 
despite the residence of a substantial number of Azeris, 
Turkomen, and Kurds in his Persian-dominated state. To 
enforce his "artificially imposed Persian consciousness," 
the Shah called upon the Society for Public Guidance, a 
police organization that suppressed all non-Persian ethnies 
and cultures.34 The monarchy established Persian as the 
official language for its government and education system 
and outlawed other languages, such as Kurdish.
34Entasser, 13.
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Kurdish leaders and organizations resisted cultural 
suppression through armed conflict, but the Pahlavi monarchy 
countered with two tactics, coopting landowning Kurds and 
crushing all revolts. The shahs offered financial rewards 
and political offices to gain the cooperation of Kurdish 
elites.35 At the same time the Iranian military and the 
SAVAK applied force against Kurdish nationalists. As a 
result, the Kurdish movements remained underground until the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979, which Kurds, except for those 
who had cooperated with the shahs, supported.
Conditions remained harsh for Kurdish nationalism under
the Republic. Although its constitution recognized the
existence of linguistic minorities in Iran, the Islamic
Republic only offered special status for non-Islamic,
religious minorities (Christian, Jewish or Zoroastrian).3e
As Ayatollah Khomeini stated:
Sometimes the word minorities is used to refer to 
people such as the Kurds, Lurs, Turks, Persians,
Baluchis, and such. These peoples should not be 
called minorities, because this term assumes that 
there is a difference between these brothers.
There is no difference between Muslims who speak 
different languages, for instance, Arabs or 
Persians. It is very probable that such problems
35Ibid., 27.
35Ibid., 30.
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have been created by those who do not wish the 
Muslim countries to be united.37
The Iranian government banned the KDPI under suspicions that
they were Marxist-inspired and sentenced its leaders to
death.38
The universal Islamic identity promoted by the 
revolutionary government was incompatible with the pre­
existing secular, cultural identity felt among the Kurds.
The Teheran government politicized religion as an ethnic 
marker. It denied other bases of identity, while implicitly 
favoring the Persian ethny. The Kurds cooperated with the 
overthrow of the Shah whose Persian-based nationalism 
threatened a Kurdish- identity. They might have supported an 
Islamic identity within which they could negotiate Kurdish- 
Persian equality. However, they rejected an Islamic 
identity that reinforced Persian dominance. Ethnicity had 
already been politicized during the Pahlavi monarchy.39
37Ruhallah al-Musavi al-Khomeini, Kash-f al-Asrar 
(Teheran, 197 9), p. 109. in David Menashri, "Khomeini's 
Policy toward Minorities," p. 216-17 in Esman and 
Rabinovich.
38A  threat they fulfilled when they assassinated 
Qassemlou in Vienna in 1989.
39Hooshang Amirahmadi, "Middle-Class Revolutions in the 
Third World," in Post Revolutionary Iran, eds. Hooshang 
Amirahmadi and Manoucher Parvin (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1988), 235. Democracy in Iran and resolution of the 
Kurdish problem, according to Amirahmadi, suffers from the 
legacy of suspicions aroused during the reign of the
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In Iraq, two opposing images of the national community 
failed to accommodate the Kurdish identity. Arab-dominated 
regimes in Baghdad promoted civic nationalism or pan-Arab 
nationalism. Leaders, such as Qasim, promoted Iraq-first 
policies and tried to use the Kurds to counter the Arab 
nationalists. The Ba'thists, on the other hand, aspired to 
international Arab leadership and, as such, viewed the Kurds 
as a threat to their Arab state.
Almost as if he had taken a page out of constructivist 
literature, Qasim worked to establish an Iraqi national 
identity. Qasim included a Kurdish sun disc (a yellow disc 
surrounded by seven red rays) on the Iraqi nationalist flag, 
as if to invite the Kurds into the national community.40 
The new government, however, could not establish "Iraqi- 
ness" in the mythical past. Also, simple symbolism lacked 
the strength to overcome the Kurdish sense of Arab dominance 
of the government.
The Arab nationalists that ousted Qasim removed the 
Kurdish sun disc from the flag and asserted Arab dominance 
of the state. Iraq, for the Ba'thists, is a secular Arab 
state and the Kurds threaten and weaken it. At the same 
time, however, the Ba'thists disallow the dismemberment of
Pahlavis.
40Izady, 67.
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their state. The Kurdish region has to remain;a part of 
Iraq so that Iraq can exploit its population and resources 
for the advantage of Arab nationalism.
In Turkey, Kurdish nationalism also grew as a 
resistance to the assertion of a non-Kurdish nationalism. 
Since Ataturk, the government has based its legitimacy upon 
the claim of ethnic homogeneity. It has denied the 
existence of ethnic Kurds, claiming instead the they were 
"Mountain Turks." Ankara backed up its insistence with 
military force. The infamous Sark Islahet Plani {Plan for 
Reforms in the East) placed the region under military rule, 
forcibly relocated Kurds and denied them employment in the 
civil service.41 The plan outlawed the public use of the 
Kurdish language. Although the police enforced the 
prohibition only fitfully, depending on the disposition of 
the government in Ankara and local officials, Kurdish 
nationalists chaffed under the restrictions.42
Through its tactics, the government strengthened the 
PKK. In 1984, the PKK consisted of only 200 fighters and 
enjoyed little popular support. Based in the Beka'a Valley 
of Lebanon, it relied on Syria for support and was 
essentially a foreign-subsidized terrorist group. By 1993,
41Ma.ngo, 983.
42Ibid., 982.
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15.000 battle-hardened, well-armed PKK guerrillas fought 
from their mountain strongholds and enjoyed the support of
375.000 sympathizers.43 Eric Rouleau, the former French
ambassador to Turkey, comments:
The surge witnessed by the PKK cannot be explained 
by either its Marxist-Leninist ideology, which is 
alien to the local mentality, or its ultimate goal 
of establishing an independent state—  a goal the 
majority of the Kurdish population does not share.44
The hard-line PKK grew after the government suppressed
moderate nationalists.
During the 1990 Newroz celebrations, the PKK made a
decisive change in tactics. It shifted its efforts from
rural villages to urban centers where mass demonstrations
were organized. The battle for local sympathy was won and
the PKK encouraged popular resistance to security forces and
the militia. Journalist Aliza Marcus records a local
comment: "PKK comes to talk to us. It's the government, the
soldiers we are afraid of because they don't talk— they
kill."45 Prime Minister Turgot Ozal responded to the PKK
threat by granting broad powers to the regional governors to
exile citizens, evacuate villages, and censor the press.
43Rouleau, 124.
44Ibid., 125.
45Christian Science Monitor. 30 August 1990, 10.
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Having grown rapidly in numbers and popularity, the PKK 
was able to take advantage of the Gulf War and the 
subsequent creation of a no-fly zone in northern Iraq. They 
could attack bases in Turkey and then flee into the no-man's 
land of Iraq. The government allied with the leaders of the 
Kurdish Federated State and launched attacks into the 
region, but has yet to end PKK resistance.
Kurdish ethnonationalism in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey is a 
reaction to Persian, Arab, and Turkish nationalism and not 
the result of uneven modernization. Kurdish movements arose 
in resistance to the state-building efforts of the dominant 
groups in their states. Economic disparity increases the 
inter-ethnic animosities that have resulted from the 
assertion of a Kurdish identity that conflicts with the 
dominant identities of the three states.
While the problems among the Kurds is an identity 
crisis, it is not a simple matter of four strong ethnic 
identities which are incompatible. The Kurdish, Persian, 
Arab, and Turkish identities can each trace their roots far 
into the primordial past. Nonetheless, Kurdish, Turkish, 
and Arab groups did not experience persistent ethnic 
violence under Ottoman rule. The conflicts between the 
Kurds and the other ethnies results from the inability or
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unwillingness of the states to create national identities 
that include their Kurdish minorities.
In addition to addressing the cause of Kurdish ethnic 
violence, constructivist theory introduces a dimension that 
is ignored by the conflictual modernizationists and the 
primordialists. Constructivists ask: What barriers prevent 
the formation of a Kurdish national identity? This question 
confronts the forces that keep the Kurds apart and allow the 
governments in Teheran, Baghdad, and Ankara to use them 
against each other.
The Question of a Kurdish National Identity 
Linguistic, regional, and religious differences among 
the Kurds cast doubt upon the likelihood of the creation of 
an identity capable of uniting the Kurds and their 
nationalist movements. The Kurds lack a common language and 
a common religion,. Furthermore regionalism and political 
differences among the Kurds undermine their attempts to 
nurture loyalties to a greater Kurdish nation and 
nationalist movement.
The Kurdish language is divided into numerous dialects. 
Several of these dialects might better be categorized as 
separate languages within a language group, because they are
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only as similar to one another as French is to Italian.46 
The powerful states that divide the Kurds have prevented 
Kurdish-speakers from developing some form of a lingua 
franca. Linguistic differences have inhibited the formation 
of a common Kurdish identity. Lacking a centralized Kurdish 
state to standardize their diverse linguistic heritage,
Kurds must base their nationhood upon another source.
Likewise, religious differences among the Kurds hinder 
national unity.47 Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims, but a 
significant number are also Shia Muslims, Alawites, and 
Yazidis. Kurdish religious communities are often divided 
along linguistic lines. Kurds experience the divisions 
between the Sunni and Shi'a communities. Additionally, the 
heretical Alawites and Yazidis within their communities 
divide the Kurds among themselves, as well as worsening 
relations with predominantly Sunni Turks, predominantly 
Sunni Arabs, and the Shi'a majority in Iran.
Finally, the Kurds suffer from regionalism and a 
politically divided leadership. The Kurds lack unity from
46Izady, 170.
47Van Bruinessen argues that traditional and religious 
structures offered the most promise for unification of the 
Kurds at least until the 1950's. Until then, all major 
revolts were led by the shayks, whose position as holy men 
provided them the authority to unify enough tribes to resist 
the central authorities. Van Bruinessen, 371.
one region to another. Even within each of the five states 
into which geopolitical forces have divided them, there 
exists factionalism. The political leaders within each 
state fight each other, their respective central 
governments, as well as the Kurdish movements in other 
states.
Kurds within each individual state disagree upon a 
single leadership even for that region. In Iran, the 
leftist Komala has engaged in bloody struggles against the 
liberal KDPI, even while government forces tried to destroy 
both. The two Kurdish groups in Iraq, the KDP and the PUK, 
have.recently united to form the Kurdish Federated State, 
but have fought feuds in the past. Talabani's PUK even ^  
allied with Saddam Hussein against their KDP ethnic 
brothers. In Turkey, although some are coerced into 
joining, many Kurds join the Ankara-backed militia against 
the rebel PKK.
The Kurds are alienated from the dominant cultures of 
their states by their ethnic identity and, yet, not unified 
with one another. Culturally and linguistically, they are 
distinct from the Persians, Arabs, and Turks. Thus, Kurdish 
identity is associated, as has been the situation throughout 
most of Kurdistan, with the support of local clan- and tribal 
leaders who fight among themselves, or the Kurdish identity
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is linked to the support of modern nationalist movements 
like the PKK, with its alien Marxist ideology and whose 
primary appeal comes from its armed resistance to the 
Turkish government.
The question of a Kurdish national identity, suggested 
by the constructivists, points to the value of 
constructivism as an approach to ethnonationalism. The 
conflictual. modern'izationist approach is too ahistorical and 
focused upon economic variables to illuminate this crucial 
aspect of Kurdish ethnonationalism. The primordialists 
begin to address the importance of identity, but stop after 
examining the psychological appeal of ethnic identity. 
Constructivist literature opens up the researcher's mind to 
the role of the argumentative creation of identities in 
ethnic conflict.
Summary
Modern Kurdish ethnonationalism grew as a response to 
others' efforts at nation-building. As Reza Shah and 
Mustafa Kemal enforced the dominance of Persian and Turkish 
identities upon their multi-ethnic states, Kurdish leaders 
resisted the expansion of central authority as well as the 
suppression of Kurdish culture. Similarly, the Arab- 
dominated state of Iraq alienated its Kurdish minority.
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Whether Arab nationalists or others controlled Baghdad,
Iraqi governments viewed the Kurds as a threat to their 
newly formed state. All three states attacked any 
expressions of "Kurdishness."
'State suppression and Kurdish resistance created a 
cycle of violence that persists. Kurdish leaders mobilized 
their followers around ethnic identity, claiming that 
discriminatory policies and economic oppression justified 
their cause. Ordinary Kurds remained generally loyal to 
their traditional leaders and supported their defense of 
their valued identity against threat of the state. For 
their part, the central governments saw Kurdish rebellions 
as justification for the suppression of the disintegrating 
threat of the Kurdish identity.
In this light, the economic disparity between the Kurds 
and their economic centers is best seen as an outcome of 
culture-based exclusion from the national community, and not 
as the source of the violence. The failure to modernize 
Kurdish regions of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey indicates the 
frustration of the central authorities. Economic 
development of Kurdistan could very well enhance the 
strength of an ethny.that has, for the large part, resisted 
assimilation and demonstrated disloyalty. The sense of a 
"colonial" rule over Kurdistan by Teheran, Baghdad, and
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Ankara worsens ethnic relations and complicates the 
resolution of the conflict, but did not cause the conflict.
Constructivist theory addresses the important issues of 
the likelihood of Kurdish assimilation within the three 
Middle Eastern states or the formation of a Kurdish national 
identity. Kurds, especially since they are well-armed and 
mobilized along ethnic lines, are unlikely to accept the 
legitimacy of a Iraq under the guise of an Arab identity or 
a Turkey under the guise of a Turkish identity. Similarly, 
they are unlikely to accept a pan-Islamic identity in Iran 
that favors the status-quo of Persian dominance. At the 
same time, the obstacles to the construction of a Kurdish 
national identity have allowed the central governments to 
divide and suppress their Kurdish minorities^
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
Together, the conflictual modernizationist, the 
primordialist and the constructivist schools offer 
approaches that enhance the understanding of the ethnic 
violence between the Kurds and the Persians, Arabs, and • 
Turks. Each identifies variables that influence the 
creation of ethnic identities, the reasons for conflict 
along ethnic lines, the persistence of conflict, or the 
irrational destructiveness of the violence in the Kurdish 
regions of Iran, Iraq and Turkey. However, the 
constructivist approach reveals the original causes of the 
ethnic conflict and introduces attempts to construct nations 
as considerations in the ethnic conflict debate. Therefore, 
constructivist considerations must be accounted for in 
future studies of ethnic conflicts.
The dependency theorists of the conflictual 
modernizationist school provide a model of. regional economic 
differentiation for the study of ethnic violence. Kurds in 
the peripheries of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey lack many of the 
material goods that modernity has brought to those states.
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Additionally, they sense that the "centers" have exploited 
Kurdistan's laborers and natural resources for the benefit 
of the dominant ethnies. Kurdish nationalists complain that 
their people suffer from economic oppression under the rule 
of non-Kurds.
However, the dependency theorists fail to address the 
role of ethnic elites in the conflict, other than to suggest 
that they might argue for economic equality for ethnic 
groups. This ignores ethnonationalist demands for cultural 
rights and autonomy. Other than identifying a source of 
grievance between the Kurds and the ethnies in the economic 
centers, the competition theorists add little to the 
understanding of the ethnic violence.
Other conflictual modernizationists argue that the 
destruction of traditional.order and elite attempts to gain 
power in the expanded polity causes ethnic conflict. The 
minor attempts to modernize Kurdistan have threatened some 
Kurdish elites, but the most important impact of 
modernization upon the violence in Kurdistan has been the 
introduction of the ideology of nationalism. Leaders of the 
Kurds, Persians, Arabs, and Turks learned the language of 
nationalism to argue for their respective group's right to 
nationhood. History denied the Kurds their own nation, 
placing them under the state authority of other ethnies.
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The primordialists examine the psychological aspects of 
ethnic identities to understand ethnic conflicts. From this 
perspective, the Kurds offer an example of a strong identity 
that commands the.psychological devotion of its members. 
Traits associated with the Kurds dictate war-like behavior, 
disdain for civilization and, even, infighting. These 
prejudices, which have roots in the subconsciences of Kurds 
and non-Kurds, increase the likelihood of violence and 
militate against the assimilation of the Kurdish identity. 
However, the existence of strong ethnic identities increases 
the likelihood of violence, but does not necessitate 
conflict with other established identities.
The example of Kurdish ethnonationalism demonstrates 
the advantages of including the constructivist approach and 
its questions to the study of an ethnic conflict. The focus 
of the constructivists upon the factors involved in creating 
national identities reveals the initial causes of the 
conflicts between the Kurds and the Persians, the Arabs, and 
the Turks, as well as illuminating the difficulties in 
establishing a Kurdish national identity.
In Iran, the shahs enforced the ethnically-homogenous, 
French national m o del., Ethnic minorities, such as the 
Kurds, that resisted Persian dominance threatened the 
monarchy's legitimacy and had to be suppressed. The violent
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tactics of the government politicized ethnicity in Iran and, 
when the Iranian revolutionaries overthrew the Pahlavis, the 
Islamic Republic could not allay Kurdish suspicions that a 
pan-Islamic state was just another method of continued 
Persian dominance. Furthermore, the secular principles of 
the Kurdish nationalists contrasted with the new regime's 
religious ideologies. Violence and oppression continued as 
they had during the monarchy.
In Iraq,.the Kurds presented the greatest threat to 
their respective state. Iraqi leaders could .neither abide ^  
the threat of armed Kurds within their state, annihilate the 
Kurds, nor accept the dismemberment of their state. The 
Kurds and Baghdad alternated between open violence, 
rebellious Kurds seeking outside support from Iran or the 
United States and the government allying with other Kurdish 
leaders, and armed peace while the government consolidated 
its power and the Kurds feuded among themselves.
The Turkish government chose to declare itself an 
ethnic Turkish Republic that excluded Kurds from thev-" 
national community. Military and educational policies 
attempted to enforce an alternative "Mountain Turk" identity 
upon Kurds within the borders of the republic, but the 
policy backfired.. The Turkish government kept a tight reign 
upon Kurdish intellectuals and nationalists until the PKK
grew large enough to oppose it. Decades of brutality 
against residents of Kurdistan created animosities that fuel 
the Kurdish nationalist movement.
Although Kurds resist their respective government, 
linguistic, religious, and political differences divide 
their nationalist movements. If there was an independent 
Kurdish nation, one must ask which of the mutually- 
incomprehensible Kurdish dialects would be the official 
language for government and education. The divided Kurds 
would have to decide within which guerrilla organization's 
region the capital would lie. They must determine whether 
the_form of government would be a liberal republic along the 
lines of the KDPI's desires, one that respected the 
authority of the powerful clans as the KDP or PUK might 
wish, or a modern socialist or communist government favored 
by the PKK and Komala. These are all questions that the 
founders of an independent Kurdistan would have to address 
prior to the first negotiations among the feuding leaders.
Constructivism introduces an important variable into 
the study of ethnic violence that is ignored in the 
conflictual modernizationist and the primordialist accounts 
of ethnic conflicts. Constructivism takes the ideological 
and argumentative aspects of ethnicity and nationalism 
seriously. Though the claims and demands of
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ethnonationalists, whether they call for patriotism, 
separatism, or autonomy, should not be taken as their honest 
motives, neither should they be ignored as meaningless. 
Demands for cultural autonomy or linguistic rights should be 
taken at face value.
Conflictual modernizationists assume that ethnic 
conflicts result from the social disturbance of 
modernization or the interest politics of elites who seek 
power or economic rewards. Identity is merely a convenient 
tool around which nonelites more readily mobilize. Demands 
for cultural preservation, cultural autonomy, and linguistic 
rights, therefore, are a ruse to mask political and economic 
interests.
Primordialists assume that ethnic identities are 
persistent remnants of a bygone era. Ethnicity holds a 
subconscious meaning to individuals and has proven its 
psychological value as a mechanism of social unity. Members 
will sacrifice self interests and even their lives for the 
group’s status and protection. However, the demands of 
ethnic nationalists, no matter how honestly felt, simply 
represent irrational attachments and, thus, are not to be 
taken seriously.
Scholars should take serious the desires of ethnic 
elites and nonelites for linguistic and cultural rights. To
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consider them as mechanisms of manipulation or remnants of 
prehistoric society misses the imagined and constructed 
nature of nations. Qasim's flag with the Kurdish sun disc, 
its subsequent removal, and the Turkish government's arrest 
and torture of Moussa Anter for authoring a Kurdish 
dictionary show the importance of these issues. When Kurds 
seek to standardize "their" language, or write "their" 
history, or even when they outline thd borders of 
"Kurdistan" on maps, they construct a nation where presently 
clan loyalties and factionalism persist. Theorists should 
not hide from these issues behind assumptions that 
nationalists do not understand their real grievances.
Given its usefulness as an analytical tool of the 
ethnic conflict in Kurdistan, constructivism should be 
applied in future studies of this phenomenon. In addition 
to the questions raised by the other approaches, further 
studies should ask if the states experiencing ethnic 
violence have promoted a national, community that is 
inclusive to all significant, potential identities. They 
should examine the means for fostering regionally-based 
identities, since nation-states are better defined as 
regions under a state's control, rather than as ethnic 
nations under a state's control. For specific cases, 
political scientists should ask, given past state policies,
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what is the likelihood of finding an identity with universal 
appeal. The answer to the worldwide reduction of ethnic 
conflict depends upon whether the West, which has promoted 
the ethnically-homogenous state as both modern and ideal, 
can peacefully change the international standard, or must 
the standard change incrementally, through violence.
154
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adams, Heribert. “The Manipulations of Ethnicity.” In State 
Versus Ethnic Claims, eds. Donald Rothchild and Victor 
Olarunso, 127-47. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1983.
Amirahmadi, Hooshang and Manoucher Parvin, eds. Post- >/'
Revolutionary Iran. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1988.
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. London: Verso,
19.83.
_________ . “New World Disorder.” New Left Review 193 (May-
June 1992): 3-13.
Barth, Fredrik. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Boston:
Little, Brown, 1969.
Bates, Robert H. “Ethnic Competition and Modernization in 
Contemporary Africa.” Comparative Political Studies 6 
(January 1974): 457-84.
Besson, Yves. “Identity crisis as a paradigm of Middle
Eastern conflictuality.” International Social Science 
Journal 43 {February 1991): 133-45.
Bloom, William. Personal Identity, National Identity and 
International Relations. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990.
Bonacich, Edna. “A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism.” American 
Sociological Review 37 (October 1972):' 547-59.
Brass, Paul R. Ethnicity and Nationalism. London: Sage 
Publications, 1991.
Brown, David. “Ethnic Revival.” Third World Journal 11 
(October’1989): 1-17.
Brown, James. “The Turkish Imbroglio.” Annals 541 (September 
1995): 116-29.
155
Connor, Walker. “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying.”
World Politics 24 (April 1972) : 319-55.
_________ . “The Politics of Ethnonationalism.” Journal of
International Affairs 27 (January 1973): 1-21.
Das Gupta, Jyotirinda. “India: Democratic Becoming and 
Combined Development.” In Politics in Developing 
Countries. eds. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour 
Martin Lipset. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner 
Publishers, 1993.
Debray, Regis. “Marxism anbd the National Question.” New 
Left Review 105 (September-October 1977): 25-41.
Depres, Leo A., ed., Ethnicity and Resource Competition in 
Plural Societies. The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1975.
Deutsch, Karl. Nationalism and Its Alternatives. New York: 
Alfred Knopf, 1969.
_________ . Nationalism and Social Communication. New York:
Wiley and Sons, 1953.'
_________ . “Social Mobilization and Political Development.”
American Political Science Review 55 (September 1961): 
493- 514.
Durkheim, Emile. The Division of Labor in Society, trans. 
George Simpson. New York: Free Press, 1933.
Entasser, Nader. Kurdish Ethnonationalism. Boulder,
Colorado: Lynne Reinner Press, 1992.
Esman, Milton J. and Itamar Rabinovich, eds., Ethnicity.
Pluralism and the State in the Middle East. Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1988.
Farouk-Sluggett, Marion, and Peter Sluggett. Iraq Since 
1958. London: I. B. Taurus, 1990.
Geertz, Clifford. “Ideology as a Cultural System.” In 
Ideology and Its Discontents, ed. David A. Apter,
47-77. New York: Free Press, 1963.
 . Old Societies and New States. New York: Free
Press, 1963.
156
Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell, 
1983.
_________ . Thought and Change. London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1964.
Ghareeb, Edmund. The Kurdish Question in Iraq. Syracuse, New 
York: Syracuse University Press, 1981.
Glazer, Nathan, and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds. Ethnicity.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, . 
1975.
Greenfeld, Liah. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1993.
Gunter, Michael. “The Kurdish Problem in Turkey.” Middle 
East Journal 42 (Summer 1988): 389-406.
Hah, Chong-do, and Jeffrey Martin. “Towards a Synthesis of 
Conflict and Integration Theories.of Nationalism.”
World Politics 27 (April 1975):361-86.
Hechter, Michael. Internal Coionailism. London Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1975.
Horowitz, Donald. .Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, 
California; University of California Press, 1985.
Izady, Mehrdad. The Kurds; A Concise Handbook. Washington 
D. C.: Taylor and Francis, 1992.
Jalali, Rita, and Seymour Martin Lipset. “Racial and Ethnic 
Conflicts: A  Global Perspective.” Political Science 
Quarterly 107 (Winter 1992): 585-606.
Kreiger, Joel, ed., The Oxford Companion to Politics of the 
World. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Mango, Andrew. “Turks and Kurds.” Middle Eastern Studies 30 ^  
(October 1994): 975-97.
Markakis, John. "Nationalities and the state in Ethipia." 
Third World Quarterly 11 (October 1989): 118-30.
f
157
Mayall, James. Nationalism and international society. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Mayall, James, and Mark Simpson. “Ethnicity is not Enough.” 
International Journal of Comparative Sociology 33 
(1992): 5-25.
Melson, Robert and Howard Wolpe. “Modernization and the
Politics of Communalism.” American Political Science 
Review 64 (December 1970): 1112-30.
Meyer, John W., and Michael T. Hannan, eds., National
Development and Social Change. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1979.
Nagel, Joane. “The Conditions of Ethnic Separatism: The ' .
Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Iraq.” Ethnicity 7 (September 
1980): 279-97.
Newman, Saul. “Does Modernization Breed Ethnic Political 
Conflict?” World Politics 43 (April 1991): 451-78.
Olson, Robert. “The Kurdish Question and Geopolitical and
Geostrategic Changes in the Middle East after the Gulf 
War.” Journal of South Asia and Middle Eastern Studies 
17 (Summer 1994): 40-67.
Olzak, Susan. The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and
Conflict. Stanford. California: Stanford University 
Press, 1992.
Olzak, Susan and Joane Nagel, eds., Competitive Ethnic 
Relations. Boston: Academic Press, 1986.
Ranger, Terence, and Eric Hobsbawm, eds., The Invention of 
Tradition. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
i
Robins, Philip. “The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the 
Kurdish Issue.” International Affairs 69 (October 
1993): 657-77.
Rothschild, Joseph. Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1981.
Rouleau, Eric. “The Challenges to Turkey.” Foreign Affairs •
72 (October 1993): 110-27.
158
Shanin, Teodor. “Ethnicity in the Soviet Union." Comparati ve 
Studies in Societies and History 31 (July 1989): 409- 
24.
Shaw, R. Paul and Yuwa Wong. The Genetic Seeds of Warfare. 
New York: Unwin Hyman, 1988.
Smelser, Neil J. The Theory of Collective Behavior. New 
York: Free Press, 1963.
Smith, A. D. The Ethnic Revival. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981.
_________ . “Nationalism and Historians.” International
Journal of Comparative Sociology 31 (1992): 58-80.
Tiryakian, E. A., and Ronald.Rogowski, eds., New
Nationalisms of the Developed West. Boston: Allen and 
Unwin, 1985.
Turner, Arthur Campbell. “Kurdish Nationalism.” In Ideology
and Power in.the Middle East, eds. Peter Chelkowski and 
Robert S. Pranger, 37 9-410. London: Duke University 
Press, 1988.
Vail, Leroy, ed. The Creation of Tribalism in Southern
Africa. Berkeley, California: University of California 
Press, 1989.
Van Bruinessen, Martin. “Kurdish Tribes and the State of
Iran.” In The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and 
Afghanistan. ed. Richard Tapper, 364-400. New York: St. 
Martin's•Press, 1983.
van den Berghe, Pierre. “Race and Ethnicity.” Ethnic and 
Racial Studies 1 (1978): 401-11.
_________ . State Violence and Ethnicity. Niwot, Colorado:
University of Colorado Press, 1990.
Young, Crawford, ed. The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism. 
Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press,
1993.
 . “Patterns of Social Conflict: State, Class and
Ethnicity.” Daedalus 111 (Spring 1982): 71-98.
